The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control: Lessons from the Ebola outbreak and an ethical framework by McIvor, Joshua
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington. 
February 29th, 2016.   
 
The Ethics of Infectious 
Disease Control: 
Lessons from the Ebola outbreak and an ethical 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Joshua McIvor 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in 
Philosophy. 
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
1 
 
Abstract: 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) devastated its way into news headlines in 2014, destroying 
communities across three West African countries and costing the lives of over 11,000 
people. The global health response was widely scrutinised and criticised, and though the 
outbreak is now over, there are still many lessons that can be learned from the 2014 EVD 
outbreak. This thesis will use the EVD outbreak in two ways. Firstly, I will use the EVD 
outbreak as a case study through which I will strive to address the ethical concerns for using 
experimental treatment during the outbreak, and I will address ethical concerns of the use 
of quarantine during the outbreak. Second, I will use the EVD outbreak as a launch pad to 
examine broader and more abstract ethical principles of the ethics of infectious disease 
control, such as the principles of reciprocity, transparency, proportionality, and the harm 
principle. This discussion will highlight how physical, biological features of a disease very 
much impact the application of the above principles when it comes to controlling the 
disease in an ethical manner. Finally, from this observation, I have created a ‘disease 
taxonomy’ that categorises infectious diseases based upon, what I argue, are the most 
ethically relevant biological features of infectious diseases. The taxonomy can aid in 
preparing for, understanding, and responding to the most pertinent ethical issues that 
surround various infectious diseases. The thesis should leave the reader with not only a 
greater understanding of some of the ethical issues raised by the 2014 EVD outbreak, but 
also a solid framework to utilise in discussing the most pertinent ethical issues of any future 
outbreak of any infectious disease.   
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Introduction. 
Plague, Smallpox, Yellow Fever, Malaria, Influenza, Polio, Tuberculosis (TB), Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Ebola, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) are 
some of the diseases that have devastated humanity over the last several centuries and in 
some cases longer. Antibiotic resistance, the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 
West Africa, the current outbreak of Zika virus in Brazil, and seasonal influenza are some of 
the frequently reported reminders of the perilous relationship humans have with the 
microbes of this world. As the global population increases, crowding becomes more 
common, and international travel more frequent, the risk pathogens pose to the global 
population rises. The relative isolation much of the globe experienced only a few centuries 
ago is diminishing and as such our ability to control the spread of infectious diseases is being 
challenged. The need for infectious disease control policy that is responsive, effective, and 
adaptive, is apparent. However, ethical issues concerning infectious disease control mustn’t 
be ignored and must be incorporated into any reasonable policy. Weighing up individual 
rights against the need to protect the greater society is a difficult task; leaning too far in 
either direction is to neglect the proper ethical analysis of the problem at hand. The purpose 
of this paper is to create an ethical framework to be used during infectious disease control. 
Though I will criticise aspects of current policy, the framework is not necessarily intended to 
be used instead of current policy, but in addition to current policy. I hope to offer a 
framework that allows for the flexibility needed when dealing with both known and novel - 
or little-known - pathogens, whilst allowing for the incorporation of well-established policy 
with regards to well-known pathogens. I hope to achieve this whilst maintaining a high 
degree of ethical consideration. The major questions I will address are: 
1) When, if ever, is it okay to use experimental treatment? 
2) When is quarantine/isolation ethically justified?1  
3) What are the key ethical principles to adhere to when it comes to infectious disease 
control? 
4) Does our application of ethical principles vary between diseases? 
                                                          
1
 Questions one and two will be the key focus when examining the 2014 EVD outbreak.  
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However, in order to have an idea of what good ethical policy may look like regarding 
infectious disease control, we must have a clear understanding of some of the established 
key points of discussion on the topic. We could dive straight into some of the broader or 
abstract discussions on the issue, yet I think it best to begin with a specific case-study and 
some of the ethical questions it raises. I do not want this paper to be an abstruse piece of 
writing, understood only by those who already have some knowledge of the issues in the 
ethics of infectious disease control. Rather, I want this paper to be widely comprehensible 
and accessible to those who may not be familiar with ethics or philosophy. As such, I want 
to minimise assumptions made and take a bottom-up approach, which leads the reader to 
the conclusions in a logical and coherent manner. Therefore, it seems natural to begin the 
discussion with a specific case study, that many should be familiar with, in order to provide 
some context before moving on to some broader points. So, to begin, I will examine the 
2014-2015 West Africa EVD outbreak and some of the ethical issues the crisis raised. 
I will be utilising the EVD outbreak in two major ways. Firstly, I will use the EVD 
outbreak as a case study through which I will strive to address the ethical concerns 
for using experimental treatment during the outbreak, and I will address the ethical 
concerns of the use of quarantine during the outbreak. Second, I will use the EVD 
outbreak as a launch pad to examine broader and more abstract ethical principles of 
the ethics of infectious disease control, such as the principles of reciprocity, 
transparency, proportionality, and the harm principle. 
My hope is that the case study will provide both a real world example of how the ethics of 
infectious disease control is far from black and white, as well as provide some empirical 
information as to how EVD works and why it was so difficult to control during this outbreak. 
A key point of discussion will be whether the use of experimental drugs on patients and staff 
is ethical in this context. An important question to reflect upon throughout this first section 
will be: what could have been done better? The purpose of this question is not to impart 
blame, but instead learn from shared experiences. The outbreak was and is a global 
problem. Thus, it is not only the duty of the countries affected to analyse the response 
taken to the crisis and strive to do better the next time a relatively novel outbreak occurs, 
but all countries must consider this. Once we understand the EVD outbreak and perhaps 
what could have been done better, we need to ask ourselves the question: do the lessons 
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we’ve learnt from the EVD outbreak apply to all diseases? That is to say, do/should the 
differences between infectious diseases affect what it means to have an ethical response to 
any given disease outbreak? Do the physical facts and features of diseases change what 
courses of action are ethically appropriate when dealing with said diseases? In section two 
of this paper I will examine this question in detail. I will analyse a number of different 
infectious diseases, as well as some of the general principles of infectious disease control 
examined by other philosophers and bioethicists. By reviewing papers that break down the 
ethics of infectious disease control to its most basic level, such as John Harris and Soren 
Holm’s “Duty not to infect others”2, I hope to provide a picture of exactly how and why we 
may feel differently about what is considered ethical when dealing with, say, SARS as 
opposed to rhinovirus (the common cold).  
This section will utilise four major ethical principles: 
1)  The principle of reciprocity, as understood and outlined by Harris and Holm. 
2) The principle of harm. 
3) The principle of proportionality. 
4) The principle of transparency.3  
These principles will form the foundation for understanding appropriate ethical 
action across all infectious diseases. Yet, our answers to the questions the principles 
pose, will change based upon physical facts of the diseases. 
Furthermore, I would like to emphasise that whilst our ethical outlook may change 
depending on the physical differences between diseases, this is not a case of us changing 
our ethics or ethical theory. I do not wish to encourage forsaking ethical standards in the 
face of adversity and simply cave to pragmatic constraints. Rather, I would like this flexibility 
to be viewed as an application of a singular ethical framework that not only allows practical 
concerns to affect our ethical outlook, but suggests that practical concerns are very much a 
part of the ethical theory itself. This will become clear later.  
After showing that appropriate ethical actions may differ between infectious 
diseases, I would like to formally lay out a type of disease taxonomy that categorises 
                                                          
2
 Harris & Holm, Is There A Moral Obligation Not To Infect Others? 
3
 Principles two, three, and four I will be taking from: Upshur, The Ethics of Quarantine. 
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infectious diseases based on what I consider to be their most ethically relevant biological 
features. From here, it is possible to make ethical claims that outline the appropriate ethical 
actions and considerations for each of the disease taxonomy categories. This section of the 
paper will be the most applied, in that it will attempt to examine actual official New Zealand 
policy. Despite my optimism as to the benefits of my framework, it will undoubtedly be 
open to much criticism. Ultimately, I am both more and less constrained than actual policy 
makers. In one respect, being a philosopher, I can afford to be a lot more idealistic when it 
comes to the ethical considerations I make when suggesting real world policy amendments. 
Although I will try to take into account as many practical constraints as possible, I will 
inevitably fall short of the kind of knowledge real policy makers have in their area of 
expertise. In another respect, I am more constrained in that I am not in fact a policy maker 
and thus lack many of the resources available to policy makers. This is not to excuse my 
culpability as the writer of this paper. It is more to say that my suggestions, guided by 
ethical theory, are still ultimately just that: suggestions. I would be very much open to 
constructive criticism that suggests alterations that would aid in making my suggestions 
more viable or even uphold a greater ethical standard. My suggestions stand insofar as the 
context of this thesis allows: if disagreement with current policy arises it will be adequately 
criticised, yet I will acknowledge my limitations and accept that a defence of such policy may 
very well stand up to my suggestions if the discussion were to be pursued. I will discuss this 
matter further in the conclusion of this paper.  
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Section One: The Ebola virus disease outbreak. 
1.1 What is Ebola Virus Disease and why was the outbreak so bad? 
Ebola, more technically Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), is a haemorrhagic disease that is 
severe and often fatal. It has a roughly 50% mortality rate, but case fatality rates have 
ranged from 20% to 90% in the past. It originates in animals, the leading candidate of which 
is fruit bats and was first seen in 1976 in two simultaneous outbreaks: one in Sudan and the 
other in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The second outbreak occurred near the 
Ebola river, from which the virus gets its name. The disease initially causes fever, fatigue, 
muscle pain, headache, and a sore throat. Subsequently, the patient will suffer vomiting, 
diarrhoea, rash, symptoms of impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases, both 
internal and external bleeding. Treatment for EVD is limited; however there are some 
promising options.4  The World Health Organisation (WHO) elaborates: 
“Supportive care rehydration with oral or intravenous fluids and treatment of specific symptoms, improves 
survival. There is as yet no proven treatment available for EVD. However, a range of potential treatments 
including blood products, immune therapies and drug therapies are currently being evaluated. No licensed 
vaccines are available yet, but 2 potential vaccines are undergoing human safety testing.”
5
 
 
Despite the severity of EVD, it is definitely possible to control the disease when adhering 
to strict hygiene practices. Before explaining why, I will need to outline some common 
terminology. My understanding is that there is some inconsistency with the utilisation of the 
following terms, so it is important that the terms are clearly defined for the purposes of this 
thesis. I will be using Kenrad E. Nelson’s terminology in this paper:6  
 Virulence: Fatality of the disease: diseases that are highly virulent are more severe 
and have a higher fatality rate. 
 Infectivity: The number of infectious particles that are required to establish an 
infection in the host (i.e. the host is considered infected with the disease and is a 
carrier). This can be measured by determining the number of individuals who 
become infected with the disease after exposure to the disease.  
                                                          
4
 WHO factsheet, Ebola virus disease.  
5
 Ibid, pg. 1. 
6
 Nelson, Infectious Disease Epidemiology – 3
rd
 Ed, pg. 36-37. 
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 Pathogenicity: A measure of the microbial agent’s ability to induce disease in the 
host, after infection. Hosts infected with a disease of low pathogenicity, such as 
polio, may not present actual symptoms of the infection.  
 Immunogenicity: The ability of the disease to produce an immune response in the 
host that will ultimately provide protection against reinfection. Diseases that are 
strongly immunogenic are ideal candidates for vaccination, as exposure to the 
disease can lead to lifelong protection from reinfection.  
 Inapparent Infection: Diseases that have low pathogenicity may have a high 
inapparent infection rate. Infection of a host can be determined by laboratory 
testing, yet a host my present no symptoms. Diseases with high inapparent infection 
rates are difficult to control, as it is very difficult to determine which individuals are 
infected with the disease.    
This terminology will become very important later in the paper. As I suggested in the 
introduction, biological features of infectious diseases are important when it comes to the 
ethics of infectious disease control. The four principles I stated in the introduction will 
require us to understand the biological features of infectious diseases if we are to adhere to 
the principles when making ethical considerations for the control of such diseases. 
Therefore, it is important that the reader understands the above terminology in order to 
properly engage with the paper later on and they may wish to turn back to this page when 
reading through the rest of the paper.  
Now that we have some clearly defined terminology, we can examine exactly why 
preventing the spread of EVD should be theoretically easier than, say, influenza. EVD has a 
high virulence, infectivity, and pathogenicity, which is why it is such a devastating disease. 
Yet there are two saving graces when it comes to preventing the spread of Ebola. Firstly, a 
susceptible host must come into contact with bodily fluids of an infected individual (or 
animal) in order to contract the disease. Though this may not sound like much of a saving 
grace, as the bodily fluids of an individual can contaminate a surface or material that can 
subsequently contaminate another human, when paired with the second saving grace, 
practitioners are left with a disease that, though certainly fierce, can be beaten by relatively 
straightforward protocols. The second saving grace is that individuals infected with EVD are 
only contagious once they are symptomatic. This means the spread of the disease, from one 
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person to another, won’t occur when the initial host is unaware that they are infected. This 
combination provides some key benefits when it comes to managing the spread of the 
disease. For one, in an uncontrolled situation, such as a contagious individual being present 
in a crowd, there are likely to be fewer individuals infected than if the disease were airborne 
(of course infectivity and pathogenicity will play a big role here, but I mean to compare as if 
the EVD virus itself was airborne, with its same properties). Second, because an individual 
needs to be symptomatic in order to be contagious, even untrained professionals can 
recognise when an individual needs to be isolated (if they understand the connection 
between contagiousness and symptoms). Third, health care professionals can utilise physical 
barriers to protect themselves and others from infected patients. This can range from 
physical isolation in a room, to wearing protective clothing. Some of these protection 
techniques may not work as well, if at all, for certain airborne diseases. With the right 
protection and hygiene practices, spread of the disease can be stemmed dramatically, as did 
eventually occur with the 2014 EVD outbreak. 
So, what made the 2014 EVD outbreak so bad? Essentially: a perfect storm of 
negative factors. A preliminary or background factor, is that EVD is what Nathan Wolfe, 
Claire Panosian Dunavan, and Jared Diamond refer to as a “stage three” disease.7 I will 
elaborate more on Wolfe et al. in the second section of this paper, but for now it is 
important to understand that a stage three disease, is one that has crossed from animals to 
humans, but will usually only undergo a few cycles of secondary transmission (human to 
human) before dying out. This means, due to the nature of the disease, stage three diseases 
tend to flare up in a population, before dying out as a result of the pathogen being unable to 
sustain itself for an extended period time outside of its reservoir host. The result is that the 
disease is very hard to study outside of outbreaks, especially if the reservoir host is 
unknown. Though the fruit bat is suspected as the reservoir host for EVD, this has not been 
definitively proven, and studying the disease is difficult.8 In addition, the economic incentive 
for large pharmaceutical companies to create treatments for diseases that only flare up 
infrequently is less than that of diseases that persist in humans for extended periods of 
time, such as influenza. The result of these factors is a population (local and international) 
                                                          
7
 Wolfe, Dunavan, & Diamond, Origins of major human infectious diseases.  
8
 For an account of the difficulties of studying the disease, as well as a detailed history of the disease I 
recommend reading “Ebola” by David Quammen, listed in the references section.   
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that was wildly underprepared for any EVD outbreak, let alone one on the scale of the 2014 
outbreak. 
The fact of the matter is the international community and health sector was 
desperately underprepared for an EVD outbreak anywhere on earth, and what made the 
situation worse was that the outbreak occurred in very poor region of the planet. There are 
many papers explaining why the 2014 EVD outbreak was so bad and what we can learn from 
the situation to prevent a repeat of the incident in the future.9 I will summarise some of the 
key issues that were encountered in this particular outbreak. Firstly, as I said earlier, the 
outbreak occurred in desperately poor countries with broken healthcare systems.10 In the 
affected countries, the healthcare systems are underfunded and lack the resources 
necessary to combat an outbreak. With a lack of protective equipment, hospital staffs were 
sometimes reluctant to go to work, out of a justified fear of contracting the disease 
themselves. Patients were reluctant to seek medical assistance at the hospitals for fear that 
if they did not already have EVD, they would certainly catch it if they went to hospital. This 
also meant that those who were in a position where they could potential help transport 
patients to hospital were also reluctant to assist, for fear of catching the disease. The 
healthcare systems were stretched to capacity and rendered largely ineffective in containing 
the disease, so there was minimal public trust in the healthcare system.11   
Secondly, the deployment of military personnel to attempt to contain the disease 
frightened much of the population. Cordons were created to restrict movement and the 
spread of the disease.12 However, it often left communities without the basic resources 
necessary to continue life and prevented those that were sick from accessing medical care. 
By and large, entire communities became robbed of their basic human rights, as 
governments scrambled to prevent the spread of the disease. This had the effect of further 
reducing public trust in the government’s ability to protect them from the disease. Cases 
like this are excellent examples of a catastrophic failure to uphold the moral principles I 
                                                          
9
 Donovan, Ebola, epidemics, and ethics – what we have learned; Gostin, West Africa’s Ebola Epidemic is Out of 
Control, but Never Had to Happen; and Omonzejele, Ethical Challenges Posed by the Ebola Virus Epidemic in 
West Africa, are three excellent papers that cover some of the ethical issues the 2014 EVD outbreak posed, as 
well as a critical assessment of the global response.  
10
 Gostin, West Africa’s Ebola Epidemic is Out of Control, but Never Had to Happen, pg. 2.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid, pg. 3. 
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mentioned earlier in the paper. Had these principles been upheld, the result would much 
better than what I have described above.  
Finally, there was a widespread lack of public education regarding the disease and 
how to protect from it. There was a prevalence of misconceptions about EVD and accurate 
news reporting was curtailed by governments.13 As a result, traditional cultural practices 
that aided in the spread of Ebola, were not strongly educated against. Local burial practices 
that involved close contact with the bodies of the deceased were widespread and largely 
contributed to the spread of the disease, often ravaging entire families. Burial practices 
included hand washing of the bodies and it should be noted that funerals are traditionally a 
large affair, with many friends and family of the deceased coming into close contact with 
the body. Needless to say, these practices did not help contain the spread of the disease; 
where, in other circumstances, a deceased host would usually mark the end of that 
particular vector of the disease. Another local practice - eating bush meat - proved risky 
when it came to the spread of EVD. Though often illegal, the killing and selling of bush meat 
is wide spread in sub-Saharan Africa. Unsurprisingly, when a disease is largely animal borne, 
this leads to an increase in incidences of the disease during an outbreak. This was the case 
with EVD. It is difficult to educate and encourage against the eating of bush meat as the 
practice is, for many poor Africans, both traditional and a source of valuable protein.14 Some 
even go as far as to claim the EVD outbreak isn’t even real and that healthcare professionals 
themselves were killing patients in order to receive western funding.15 Clearly, greater 
public education was needed to prevent the spread of EVD as well as restore trust in the 
health care systems. 
So, a whole host of factors created the perfect storm, which led to the 2014 West Africa 
EVD outbreak being the worst EVD outbreak in history. The difficulties of employing a 
largely unprepared global health care community against a disease we did not know much 
about, in one of the poorest regions one earth, where much of the population is 
uneducated and the healthcare systems are broken, led to the deaths of over 11,000 
individuals. But what can we learn from the outbreak? To answer this question, we will need 
                                                          
13
 Gostin, West Africa’s Ebola Epidemic is Out of Control, but Never Had to Happen, pg. 2  
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Donovan, Ebola, epidemics, and ethics – what we have learned, pg. 2.  
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to examine some of the major ethical quandaries that arose from the outbreak. First and 
most significantly I will look at the use of experimental treatment during the outbreak. 
Then, I will examine the use of quarantine during the outbreak. My hope is that by 
examining these issues, the reader can grasp some of the major ethical issues and 
challenges the 2014 EVD outbreak posed and thus get an idea as to the kind of hurdles that 
need to be overcome when dealing with infectious disease control more generally. 
1.2 An Ethical Issue: the use of experimental drugs during the outbreak.     
In August of 2014, when the EVD outbreak in West Africa was close to its peak, two 
American volunteers, Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol contracted EVD while working in 
Liberia. They were treated with an experimental drug called Zmapp, which was a 
combination of three monoclonal antibodies that were never before administered to 
humans.16 The condition of Brantly and Writebol reportedly improved after receiving the 
drug.17 Though the survival of Brantly and Writebol, once receiving Zmapp, understandably 
brought hope to many, the survival of only two patients is hardly enough to establish the 
validity of the treatment, as a sample group of only two individuals is not a statistically 
significant group. Furthermore, preclinical and clinical trials are needed to determine the 
safety and efficacy of a new drug.18 Nevertheless, the whole ordeal generated much 
controversy in the media and raised a whole host of ethical questions surrounding the use 
of experimental treatment during an outbreak. I will attempt to break down some of these 
questions and offer answers that may indicate how we can collectively deal with future 
infectious disease outbreaks. 
1.2.1 Why was there no widespread treatment for EVD already? 
A common question that arises when the issue of experimental EVD treatment is raised 
is either “why was there was no vaccine already?” or “why was there so little of the only 
(potentially) effective treatment available (i.e. Zmapp)?” This is an understandable question 
and we do, after all, live in a world where many communicable diseases have an effective 
treatment, vaccine, or some kind of effective prevention. Additionally, we have known 
about EVD and its lethality since the late 70’s. One of the reasons, rather sadly (though 
                                                          
16
 Gupta and Dellorto, Experimental drug likely saved Ebola patients. 
17
 Goodman, Studying ‘Secret Serums’ – Toward Safe, Effective Ebola Treatments, pg. 1087.  
18
 More on this: West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law, Food and Drug Administration.  
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perhaps not unjustly), seems to be that there was little motivation for drug companies to 
research EVD treatments due to the fact that until 2014, outbreaks only affected dozens or 
at the most a few hundred individuals: there simply weren’t enough people affected by the 
disease.19 Furthermore, the disease was confined to sub-Saharan Africa, one of the poorest 
regions on earth. There was simply little money to be made from the development of an 
effective treatment for EVD. Yet, there are also practical reasons it has been difficult to 
develop an effective treatment for EVD. Wolfe et al. categorise EVD as a stage 3 disease, 
meaning it can spread from animals to humans (primary transmission), and from humans to 
humans (secondary transmission), but normally only undergoes a few cycles of secondary 
transmission. Outbreaks, therefore, tend to burn themselves out.20 As said, up until the 
2014 outbreak, EVD only flared up in small communities and for relatively short amounts of 
time. So, even researchers who have the motivation to develop an effective treatment for 
EVD will struggle when it comes to studying the disease. It would undoubtedly involve 
trekking into the depths of the African interior, through treacherous and hostile terrain.21 
Furthermore, there would be limited opportunities to study the disease in humans, 
compared to the ample supply of humans infected with influenza every year. All in all, this 
may seem a pretty weak defence of why we don’t (or didn’t prior to the 2014 outbreak) 
have an effective treatment for EVD. We could examine the question of what moral 
obligations we have as a global community to prepare for diseases such as EVD, but that will 
not be in the scope of this thesis.22 For now, the above is by way of an explanation as to why 
no effective treatment was available for EVD prior to the 2014 outbreak.  
1.2.2 Was the use of experimental drugs during the EVD outbreak ethical? 
Despite there not being an effective treatment in place during the 2014 EVD 
outbreak, there had been research into EVD drugs and vaccines for the previous decade or 
so. The problem at the time was while “Some of these have shown promising results in the 
laboratory and in animal models… they have not yet been evaluated for safety and efficacy 
                                                          
19
 Donovan, Ebola, epidemics, and ethics – what have we learned, pg. 4.  
20
 Wolfe, Dunavan, & Diamond, Origins of major human infectious diseases, pg. 280.  
21
 Quammen, Ebola: The Natural and Human History of a Deadly Virus. 
22
 If the reader is interested in one suggestion of how to be better prepared for future zoonotic-origin 
outbreaks, the following is an interesting proposal: Wolfe, Dunavan, & Diamond, Origins of major human 
infectious diseases, pg. 283. 
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in humans.”23 This put health care professionals and the WHO in a very difficult spot. As the 
WHO pointed out “The large number of people affected by the present outbreak in West 
Africa and the high case-fatality rate have prompted calls to accelerate the evaluation and 
development of these investigational medical interventions and to use them to try to save 
the lives of patients and curb the epidemic.”24 Yet, despite public pressure, medical 
professionals must always ensure they act in a safe and ethical manner, and the matter of 
treating sick individuals with a treatment that has not yet been proven safe for humans, is a 
very risky business, due to the lack of clinical trials. It is an understandable urge for the 
general public to take an “anything is better than nothing” approach to experimental 
treatment, when we see thousands of individual’s dying from a horrendous disease. That 
said, we cannot allow this very human drive to help others, cloud our judgement and we 
must remember the regulatory and safety framework in place when it comes to drug 
development, is there for a reason. So, the WHO decided to convene an emergency panel, 
inviting top bioethicists, scientists, medical professionals, and researchers from around the 
world, to discuss the ethics of using unregistered treatments during the 2014 EVD 
outbreak.25 The panel was held on the 11th of August 2014, five days after the American 
doctors, mentioned above, were treated with Zmapp. The report produced to outline the 
findings of the panel, was utilised for further academic discussion and critique of the WHO’s 
findings. I will utilise the report, as well as supporting academic criticisms, to offer my own 
analysis of the ethics of using experimental treatment during infectious disease outbreaks.  
The WHO panel were tasked with offering insight into five questions: 
“1. Is it ethical to use unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and 
in animal models but have unknown adverse effects in humans for possible treatment of people who are 
infected? If yes, what criteria and conditions must be satisfied before they can be used?  
2. Is it ethical to use unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and 
in animal models but have unknown adverse effects in humans for prophylaxis in people who are 
exposed but who show no signs of disease (i.e. post-exposure prophylaxis)? If yes, what criteria and 
conditions must be satisfied before they can be used?  
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3. Is it ethical to use unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and 
in animal models but have unknown adverse effects in humans for prophylaxis in people who may be 
exposed (i.e. pre-exposure prophylaxis)? If yes, what criteria and conditions must be satisfied before they 
can be used?  
4. If it is ethical to use unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and 
in animal models under the circumstances described above, what criteria should guide the choice of 
intervention?  
5. If it is ethical to use unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the laboratory and 
in animal models under the above circumstances, who should receive priority for treatment or 
prevention?”
26 
These issues boil down to a few major questions that need to be answered not only for the 
EVD outbreak, but also for potential future outbreaks of any infectious disease: 
1) Is it ever ethical, during an outbreak, to use experimental treatments that have not 
been proven safe on humans… 
a. That are infected? 
b. That risk becoming infected? 
2) What conditions must be met in order for such treatment to be given? 
3) How do we prioritise treatment if the resources are limited? 
In answer to the first question, the WHO panel said ‘yes’. They concluded that it is ethical to 
use experimental treatment during the EVD outbreak, and there is even an ethical 
imperative to do so, given certain criteria are fulfilled.27 Was this assessment fair? I think so. 
Firstly, as the WHO pointed out, the EVD outbreak comprised an exceptional set of 
circumstances.28 The high fatality rate and rapid spread of the disease mean the risk 
imposed by utilising unregistered medical interventions (that do have evidence in their 
favour) is outweighed by the current devastation the outbreak is already creating. 
Furthermore, the method of controlling the disease by simply controlling its spread (a very 
common and age old practice) could be, and is, criticised as being ineffective in this case, 
with Sarah Edwards writing “WHO’s previous practice of relying solely on containing the 
spread of EVD by restricting travel between affected villages (and now between affected 
                                                          
26
 WHO, Ethical considerations for use of unregistered interventions for Ebola virus disease, pg. 3.  
27
 These criteria are outline on pgs. 5-7 of the report.  
28
 Ibid, pg. 4. 
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
16 
 
countries) and by communicating health messages to promote everyday personal hygiene in 
the community. This ‘tested’ practice of the past is clearly failing this time.”29 I don’t think 
the tested practices were “failing” however. Rather, as the disease continues to spread and 
infect new individuals, alternative means of control must be considered, in addition to the 
tried and tested practices. In other words, the current approach is struggling, thus we need 
to be open to more drastic options, especially given the current circumstances. That said, 
this is not to say that continuing to impose travel restriction, perhaps clamping down harder 
on travel and so on, is not something worth doing. More, I think Edwards is meaning that 
this approach has not been sufficient and we must look at other options; in drastic 
circumstances we must use everything at our disposal. 
Secondly, there was little commercial incentive to develop effective treatments 
before the 2014 outbreak, as I stated earlier. With public pressure mounting and an 
outbreak occurring on an unprecedented scale, health professionals were provided an 
opportunity to gather information on the efficacy of potential EVD treatments. Though it 
certainly seems distasteful to look for a silver lining when individuals are dying in their 
thousands from a deadly disease, the only way to study treatments for diseases like EVD is 
during an outbreak. This is the only way enough evidence can be gathered on the efficacy of 
potential treatments. Of course, tests can be done that don’t involve humans but ultimately 
the safety and efficacy of a drug cannot be scientifically established until results in humans 
are studied. This further aids the case that the use of experimental treatments during the 
outbreak is ethically justified. Not only do individuals with no effective treatment options 
get the chance to utilise a treatment that may save their life but, if a comprehensive 
research framework is in place, many more individuals in the future may be spared the 
devastating consequences of the untreated disease. This point should not, and has not, 
gone unchallenged though. As Kevin Donovan points out “There have been examples in the 
past of untested and under tested therapies being rushed into service, and ultimately doing 
the patients a disservice. Some of these misadventures occurred on the African continent, 
leading to a pervasive distrust of Western drug companies using Africans as their 
experimental “guinea pigs”.”30 Though he and many others ultimately agree with the WHO’s 
                                                          
29
 Edwards, Experimental Treatments for Ebola, pg. 126.  
30
 Donovan, Ebola, epidemics, and ethics – what we have learned, pg. 3.  
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
17 
 
findings31 (to varying degrees), some warn strongly against using untested drugs to combat 
EVD. Peter Omonzejele is one such critic and highlights some of the potential costs of using 
experimental drugs. He points to the 1996 Pfizer Kano meningitis trial in Nigeria.32 The trial 
tested a new drug, Trovafloxacin, to treat meningitis. As a result of the trial 11 children died 
and over 200 became permanently disabled in some way. Though deaths alone may not be 
enough to classify a trial as immoral (cancer patients may agree to the risk the trial poses for 
the chance of getting better), the biggest issue was the issue of consent, or the lack 
thereof.33 A clinical trial is unlikely to be ethically justified if the participants are unaware of 
the associated risks and do not (or can’t) give consent, unless the results of the trial 
prevented an epidemic that would kill thousands. However, considering counterfactuals like 
“what if the drug saved thousands but was tested unethically”, become dicey when 
navigating the ethics of infectious disease control as they can always be raised. Ultimately, 
the ethical guidelines to clinical trials, such as clear consent, are designed on the basis that 
the desired outcome (an effective treatment) can still be achieved whilst upholding 
individual rights. If there were a serious possibility of saving thousands of lives that required 
the disregard of some of the ethical standards of a clinical trial, such as informed consent, 
then perhaps such action could be considered morally justified. These probabilities need to 
be examined on a case by case basis.  
Clearly the Pfizer Kano trial had a disastrous outcome, the bypassing of ethical 
standards had no ultimate benefit and Omonzejele argues that the circumstances that 
surrounded the Pfizer Kano trial, are very similar to the circumstances of the 2014 EVD 
outbreak, thus “if the Pfizer Kano trial was unethical, then making experimental drugs 
available to West African populations who are in the midst of the EVD epidemic cannot 
possibly pass the research ethics test.”34 This is because, as clearly demonstrated in the 
Pfizer Kano meningitis trial, circumventing research ethics in the quest for new drugs carries 
enormous risks.” Omonzejele’s point is well taken and he offers a very appropriate caution 
in a situation that, because of its unique and destructive circumstances, people are pressed 
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to do anything to help. That said I consider it extremely pessimistic to suggest that we 
cannot learn from a well documented and widely criticised case. Though it must certainly be 
ensured that there is not a repeat of the Pfizer Kano trial, we cannot allow the incident to 
make us overly worried that we will repeat the incident, thus prevent us from being able to 
provide help where possible. Additionally, let’s compare the Pfizer Kano trial and the 2014 
EVD outbreak to see if there are significant differences. First, it must be noted that the 
incident is highly controversial, with Pfizer Kano denying many of the claims made, stating: 
“Pfizer did not misrepresent or conceal any facts in its decision to come to Nigeria. In fact, 
the company’s intent was clear from the beginning. Pfizer’s long-term goal was to bring a 
lifesaving, innovative, and cost-effective form of antibiotic that could be used effectively in a 
meningitis epidemic in a developing country.”35 Despite this, a lengthy legal battle ensued 
and Pfizer ultimately paid out at least some of the families.36 So bear in mind the case is not 
cut and dried.  
The first major difference between the Pfizer Kano trial and the EVD outbreak is that 
there was already some effective treatment in place at the time of the Nigerian outbreak. In 
fact, ceftriaxone, the drug Pfizer used as the control in its study, is still the primary antibiotic 
used during outbreaks in Africa.37 This is clearly a big difference. Furthermore, it is even 
alleged that the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières was offering the standard treatment in 
another part of the same building as the Pfizer Kano trial.38 The central point here being: 
there was already a standard effective treatment in place for meningococcal meningitis at 
the time of the Pfizer Kano trial. As we well know, this was not the case with the 2014 EVD 
outbreak. Had there been no effective treatment at the time of the Pfizer Kano trial, and 
their drug had at least saved some lives, would we still have deemed it unethical? My 
intuition is; we would have looked at it through a much brighter lens, looking at the lives 
that were saved, not the ones that were lost.  A second big difference between the Pfizer 
Kano trial and the EVD outbreak, is the fatality rates of the diseases. As said on page six of 
this thesis, EVD has a case fatality rate averaging on 50%, whereas meningococcal 
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meningitis has a fatality rate of 5-10% (with treatment).39 EVD simply kills more infected 
individuals that meningococcal meningitis, which means the survival rate of any given 
infected person, is much worse. Thus, the use of experimental treatment may be seen as 
more rational from an individual’s point of view: they are more likely to die if untreated 
anyway, so why not take a chance with the experimental treatment? On the other hand the 
meningococcal patient might rather take their chances with the standard treatment and not 
risk the unknown effects of the experimental treatment.  
The final difference between the Pfizer Kano trial and the EVD outbreak is that 
meningococcal meningitis has no animal reservoir and is a stage five disease.40 This means 
there is much more opportunity to study the disease in humans and develop treatments 
more frequently. Remember one advantage of studying experimental treatments for EVD in 
humans during an outbreak, is that the disease often disappears for a long time in between 
outbreaks, as it retreats back to its animal reservoir. There was no such imperative during 
the Pfizer Kano trial. So, to rebut Omonzejele’s concern that the use of experimental 
treatment during the EVD would result in a repeat of the Pfizer Kano (which was at least 
controversially unethical), I think the above differences mean we need not worry about 
falling into unethical territory. Furthermore, the conditions outlined in the latter part of the 
WHO report, if met, would ensure the highest ethical standards are upheld. It is always 
difficult to strike a balance between providing help as quickly and efficiently as possible, and 
ensuring the principle of first doing no harm is upheld. In this case, I think the WHO have 
gotten it right. The nuance is well summarised by Jesse Goodman: “As we move forward, 
quickly but cautiously, in using and testing new therapies, we have already learned some 
lessons from this outbreak — regarding the need to build trust, the need to enhance public 
understanding of experimental treatments and their safe evaluation, and the critical nature 
of the capacity both for public health intervention and to ethically field clinical studies under 
challenging conditions. When it comes to infectious diseases, we are increasingly one world 
and dependent on each other for knowledge, safety, and security.”41 Extrapolating this to 
our case here, this means we have collectively learned some important ethical lessons 
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through experience and we can be optimistic that the use of experimental treatment in the 
EVD outbreak will be done in a safe and ethical manner.   
 The panel did not arrive at a decisive conclusion as to the ethics of using 
experimental treatment as prophylaxis in any case. With the limited experimental 
treatments available at the time, I imagine the need for prophylactic treatment would be 
limited and its use not warranted. There was some discussion, though opinions were split on 
the issue, of prioritising health care workers as candidates for the use of therapy. At any 
rate, it would not appear as though any clear outcome was made with regards to the use of 
experimental treatment for strictly prophylactic purposes and I am unsure if this ultimately 
occurred. For now, we must consider questions 1b and 1c, listed above, as unanswered by 
the WHO.42 For our purposes, I would consider the use of an experimental drug as 
prophylaxis to come down to a few factors. First, is how much of the drug is available. If 
there is very limited availability of the drug, then the priority should be to aid those who are 
sick. This has the benefit of both helping those who otherwise may die, and providing 
clinical information on how the drug works as a treatment. Second, assuming availability 
wasn’t an issue, I would consider who should receive the drug as prophylaxis. Intuitively, 
front-line healthcare workers would benefit the most from such protection and, as health 
care workers; they would understand the risks associated with using an experimental drug, 
thus minimising issues of consent. Finally, we must consider what other means of protection 
from infection there are. If cheaper alternatives protect individuals from the disease equally 
or almost as well as the drug would, then it would be an unnecessary waste of resources to 
widely use the drug as prophylaxis. Assuming the above factors allow for the use of an 
experimental drug, and all the WHO’s criteria are met, prophylactic use of an experimental 
drug is ethical. Unfortunately, in the case of the 2014 EVD outbreak, there wasn’t enough 
availability of the drugs to ethically allow for prophylactic use.43 
I do not wish to spend much time discussing the WHO’s answer to question 2, listed 
above. In relation to the EVD outbreak, I agree with the WHO’s conclusions as to the 
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conditions that must be met in order for the use of experimental treatments to be 
considered. Any deviation in my own opinion from the WHO’s conclusions applied beyond 
EVD, will be discussed in section two of this paper. For now, the reader can refer to the 
WHO report to find the full, detailed list of conditions, which include: sticking to well-
founded traditional research ethics, utilising risk assessment, utilising experimental 
treatments that have been proven safe in relevant animal models, transparency, clear 
consent, the sharing of data and information between agencies, and feasibility. Thus, as I 
stated earlier, we can be optimistic that in this particular case, the correct ethical measures 
should be taken and we won’t have a repeat of the Pfizer Kano trial. 
Finally, with the experimental treatments being a particularly scarce resource, how 
should we prioritise the allocation of the treatment? On this particular point the WHO 
recommended further discussion was warranted. They also suggested a further discussion 
was allocated to answer the question: what are the ethical criteria for distributing the 
experimental treatments among communities and between countries?44 The WHO’s own 
response to the point was understandably limited; the issue is contentious and requires a 
lot of philosophical debate. Furthermore, there was disagreement on what I consider to be 
an important point and I suspect the reason the report’s analysis on the topic is more or less 
inconclusive, is due to a lack of unanimity after the panel discussion. I will now take a look at 
the WHO’s comments and offer some analysis of my own. The first criterion for ethical 
distribution that the panel mentions is “Distributive justice: fairness between countries and 
among populations within countries”.45 On the surface, this might seem an intuitively valid 
criterion, but I personally think a lot hinges on what our concept of “fairness” is, as well as 
what the scope of the “countries” is. Though fairness may seem like a simple concept, what 
is fair is often interpreted in many different ways. For example, we may consider that if 
there is a joint expenditure to be made between a group of five friends, then the fair thing 
to do would be to make them all pay an equal amount. Yet what if two of those friends are 
low income students, accruing debt by the week, whilst two work full time, minimum wage 
jobs, and the final friend recently won the lottery? If all pay an equal amount, the 
proportion the amount will be relative to total worth or income will differ greatly between 
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friends, thus affecting some of the friends more negatively than others. Perhaps, it may be 
argued, it is still fair because the friends who can’t comfortably afford the expenditure 
shouldn’t partake in the joint group activity that is incurring the cost in the first place. But 
where does that end? It is not as if the friend that won the lottery had to work for his 
money, he was just lucky. The answer to this thought experiment doesn’t matter, what does 
matter is that people probably differ greatly on what they consider to be the right answer to 
what the ‘fair’ approach is in the thought experiment. So we must be clear about what is 
considered fair, when it comes to distributing the experimental treatments across countries. 
I would argue the fairest approach would be to send the most treatments to those countries 
that stand the highest chance of benefiting the most people and send the least treatments 
to those countries where the use of the treatments may be in vain (i.e. largely ineffective at 
preventing the spread of the disease or benefiting large portions of the population). So in 
the case of the 2014 EVD outbreak, the limited drugs should have been sent to the West 
African countries that were affected. 
In the case of EVD the issue of how to distribute the limited number of experimental 
treatment doses between countries/societies may be relatively clear cut. Only 36 cases of 
EVD were reported outside of the main three West African nations, and the threat to other 
countries was relatively low, due to such advanced warning. This would not necessarily be 
the case for other possible pandemics, so the issue would have to be answered on a case-
by-case basis. Factors such as how many doses are available, how many individuals are 
affected, and the biological features of the disease, are going to play a big role in 
determining the most ethical way to distribute the experimental treatment between 
countries. When the number of available doses becomes few enough, the answer to the 
issue becomes relatively arbitrary, especially if many people across a few countries are 
affected: there simply aren’t enough doses to significantly hinder the spread of the disease 
so whether or not a particular country receives doses almost becomes a lottery. In such a 
case you can either split the doses between countries proportionally, based upon number 
cases, or begin looking at the individuals within each society. This method can unfortunately 
appear ruthlessly pragmatic, yet it is what is necessary and fair when it comes to controlling 
infectious diseases.  
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How to distribute experimental treatment within a society comes down to two 
criteria, outlined by the WHO panel: “Reciprocity and Social Usefulness”.46 Essentially, this 
meant some members of the panel proposed health care workers to be of the highest 
priority when it comes to receiving experimental treatment, because they have risked their 
lives treating the ill (thus priority would adhere to the principle of reciprocity) and they are 
very important when it comes to controlling the outbreak and helping others (this would 
adhere to the principle of social usefulness). The report notes that “Other panel members 
advocated that the patients in the community should have the same priority as the groups 
mentioned above [health care workers], particularly for therapy.”47 This is fundamentally an 
example of a disagreement over what is considered ‘fair’, as discussed above. Furthermore, 
this disagreement in the panel raises the issue of why Western healthcare workers were 
being treated with experimental drugs, whilst Africans were being left to die. It’s a 
contentious point, but I agree with the panel members that supported the prioritisation of 
health care workers.  
The backbone to dealing with outbreaks in any corner of the globe is always going to 
be health care workers on the ground. As a society, we need to be able to assure these 
people that their altruistic attitude in helping others at great personal risk will be 
reciprocated if they fall ill. To do otherwise runs the risk of discouraging those that may be 
of great help, from offering to aid in outbreaks. That said, this should include African health 
care workers who have suffered greatly throughout the outbreak while continuing to risk 
their lives to help others.48 As the health care infrastructure in the affected countries was far 
from adequate to deal with such an outbreak, it may be of more importance to aid those 
systems and workers of the affected countries. That way they are better able to cope on 
their own, which may be a better result than initially offering experimental treatment to 
Western health care workers, unless if by doing so more resources are freed up to aid the 
local community and health care system.49 Furthermore, health care workers are better 
educated on the risks associated with undergoing experimental treatment and so are better 
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candidates to provide full consent. Ultimately, though we may be tempted to consider 
regular members of the community as equal candidates for experimental treatment, I think 
there are strong pragmatic reasons why we need to consider health care workers as higher 
priorities for experimental treatment. A strong health care system, which will be founded on 
healthy and able workers, is necessary to effectively combat any infectious disease, thus 
prioritising health care workers for experimental treatment is necessary in combating EVD.  
This conclusion, however, does not get us across the finish line. We still must tackle 
the issue of how to prioritise between western healthcare workers and local African 
healthcare workers. If two American healthcare workers received ZMapp after contracting 
EVD, why shouldn’t local healthcare workers receive the same? Fundamentally, should the 
visiting Swedish healthcare worker get prioritisation over local healthcare workers? It’s a 
hard question to answer, but I think the criteria of reciprocity and social usefulness, 
discussed above, may help us here. First, let’s examine a pragmatic concern: rational self-
interest. The Swedish healthcare worker volunteering in Guinea is choosing to put her own 
health at risk to battle a disease that is not affecting her home country and is unlikely to 
anytime in the near future. Could we be disincentivising such altruistic action, and thus a 
means to combat the disease, by openly giving local healthcare workers what few doses of 
potentially life-saving experimental treatment there are over foreign healthcare workers? 
It’s a valid concern yet a hard one to answer. On the one hand, it may very well be the case 
that we could be disincentivising such altruistic action in the future if we do not prioritise 
foreign healthcare workers when it comes to doses of experimental treatment. Yet, I would 
be surprised if this were the case. The healthcare workers in question are already knowingly 
risking their lives, many before they even knew of experimental treatment like ZMapp, so I 
don’t think such prioritisation would necessarily dissuade them. Furthermore, the same 
argument could be made for local healthcare workers. If foreign healthcare workers were 
prioritised, then local doctors and nurses might choose to stay at home and avoid 
potentially contracting the disease rather than risk their live. But once again, I am dubious 
that this would be the case purely as a result of prioritisation of foreign doctors for doses of, 
say, ZMapp. So I cannot see this being a persuasive factor in either direction. Therefore we 
must look to reciprocity and social usefulness. Are either party being more fairly 
compensated by receiving experimental treatment prioritisation? I would argue it is 
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marginal. Though the foreign healthcare workers are probably going more out of their way 
to help where they otherwise would be one hundred per cent safe, the disease could not be 
fought without the massive effort made by local healthcare workers. What of social 
usefulness? This would be hard to quantify, though perhaps healthcare services may have a 
chance at it. On average do foreign healthcare workers or local healthcare workers do more 
when it comes to battling EVD? How do we even quantify this: patients treated, number of 
house spent in “at risk” environments, “expertise” brought to the field? I would be surprised 
if proportionally, this was not pretty close to even. If there were a strong difference, then I 
would suggest prioritising treatment accordingly. Otherwise, the issue isn’t how to prioritise 
between foreign healthcare workers and local healthcare workers, but how to prioritise 
within the category of healthcare worker across the board. The doses should be spread 
between foreign and local healthcare workers, but prioritisation should go to those who 
stand to be able to do the most social good if they were to survive. Therefore, the local 
doctor with twenty years expertise working with in the local environment with deadly 
diseases, who has mastered infectious disease control techniques and who’s methods have 
saved countless lives, should probably get priority over the foreign healthcare worker who is 
acting as a stretcher-bearer or decontaminator. If the doctor lives, he is likely to generate 
more utility than the stretcher-bearer. This may seem ruthlessly pragmatic, but it is rational. 
This logic would have to be applied across the entire healthcare worker body, in all three 
countries, especially when the doses are so low.  
The remaining criteria for prioritisation of experimental treatment that the WHO 
panel’s report provides are seemingly uncontroversial. They include; transparency in the 
allocation process, a duty to provide supportive care, a minimum amount of infrastructure 
must be in place, involving the community, consent, and promoting trust in the health care 
system.50 I can’t imagine a substantive argument could be made against these criteria, as 
most are pragmatic.                 
This concludes my discussion of the ethics of utilising experimental treatment during 
the EVD outbreak. The main purpose of the discussion was to highlight the complexity and 
controversy that surrounds even apparently simple ethical decisions, during a difficult 
situation like an outbreak. Additionally, the question of the use of experimental treatment 
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will arise again and I want the reader to have a comprehensive understanding of the logic 
and argumentation involved in justifying any use of experimental treatments. As I stated 
earlier, many people may have considered the answer to the question obvious; of course it 
is ethical to offer experimental treatment during an outbreak. But the issue is a lot more 
complex than that and in reality we really only scratched the surface here: delving in to just 
a few key ethical concerns. What I encourage the reader to keep in mind, is the overall plan 
for this thesis. We are going to move from the very specific case study of the 2014 EVD 
outbreak, to more general ethical principles of infectious disease control. So, we need to 
keep in mind how the lessons we are beginning to learn from the EVD outbreak may apply 
to other scenarios and perhaps more importantly, how they may not apply to different 
scenarios.   
1.3 An ethical issue: quarantine. 
The final ethical issue I would like to consider before moving on is the issue of 
quarantine and isolation. This will be a brief look, as the ethics of quarantine and isolation 
will be discussed in greater detail later on in this paper, as it is one of the oldest and most 
common means of dealing with infectious diseases. Furthermore, it involves the physical 
restriction of one’s autonomy, which is no small freedom to take away. During the EVD 
outbreak there were some worrisome quarantine practices, to say the least. As such, it is 
worthwhile taking a quick look at some of the issues that arose from quarantine during the 
outbreak. 
As previously stated, when EVD struck in 2014, there was no effective treatment in 
place and the countries it spread through had poor health care infrastructures. This meant 
one of the only tools available to try and control the spread of EVD, in many cases, was 
quarantine. Quarantine is the practice of physically isolating individuals who are suspected 
to have an infectious disease or who have come in contact with someone who has an 
infectious disease, in order to prevent the spread of the disease. This is different from 
isolation, in which individuals who are already confirmed with having a particular infectious 
disease are physically isolated. It is worth noting that already we can see one major problem 
when it comes to applying quarantine to the EVD outbreak: individuals are not contagious 
until they are symptomatic. So although asymptomatic individuals may carry the disease, 
they will not be able to spread it to others until they are symptomatic. So in theory, most of 
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the focus in the case of EVD should be on isolating individuals once they are symptomatic 
and thus confirmed to have the disease. Though quarantining those who may have been 
exposed to the disease will certainly provide a further safety net and allow for immediate 
isolation of symptomatic patients, the monitoring and isolation of sick individuals may prove 
just as effective, yet less invasive and restrictive as quarantining large groups of individuals 
who may be infected. Though of course precautions and pragmatic concerns will inevitably 
call for the quarantining of individuals, the scale and tactics of some of the quarantining 
practices during the EVD outbreak was bordering on medieval.51 This brings us to one of the 
biggest concerns regarding the ethics of quarantine during the EVD outbreak: adherence to 
the principle of reciprocity. This principle will be talked about in more detail later but the 
idea is: given quarantine is supposed to be for the benefit of the society and comes at a cost 
to the individual, individuals who are quarantined are ethically required to be treated 
properly, with due respect and gratitude for being isolated. In some parts, during the EVD 
outbreak, no such reciprocity was given. Lawrence Gostin summarises: 
“They have invoked quarantine, ranging from stay-at-home days for “reflection, education, and prayers” to 
guarded home confinement. The military has been deployed for house-to-house searches, traveller 
checkpoints, and cordon sanitaire (a guarded line preventing anyone from leaving)—sometimes separating 
people and regions of the country.  
These cordons sanitaires are of the medieval variety practiced during the Black Death. In West African 
“hotspots” (with uncontrolled transmission) armed troops have established blockades, closed roads, and 
banned travel beyond the guarded perimeter. The populace is fearful, not only of exposure to EVD, but also of 
isolation and starvation, as food prices soar.”
52
 
 
Not only do countless ethical concerns come to mind when examining these 
practices, but there are major practical concerns as well. If individuals are treated in the 
manner outlined above, then people will become fearful of government interventions. They 
will be dubious when genuine help does arrive, for fear of being treated like plague sufferers 
in Victorian England. They will be reluctant to go to hospitals, for the treatment of EVD or 
indeed any other illness, out of fear of being forcibly placed in areas where they run the risk 
of catching EVD, if they haven’t already. This is hugely problematic if we want an effective 
response to be taken, as any response will require the trust of the public. If the government 
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doesn’t have the public’s trust, for whatever reason, then it will be difficult to get them to 
comply with practices which will objectively benefit them. So, practical concerns aside, how 
do the practices, described above, hold up to ethical considerations? Could they ever be 
ethically justified?  
To answer the above questions, I think we need to imagine potential pandemics as 
falling onto a scale, based upon biological factors of the disease in question and social, 
political, and economic factors that surround the outbreak. On one end of the scale we have 
increased incidences of the common cold, not too many but enough to classify as an 
outbreak or pandemic. Would cordoning off entire communities, cutting them off to food, 
water, and medical care, be warranted if it was effective in preventing the spread of the 
disease? Probably not, in all likelihood a lot more harm than good would come of it. On the 
other end of the scale, we have a disease that kills upwards of 50% of those it infects, and a 
further 45% become delusional, angry, lose touch with all sense of self, and have an 
overwhelming desire to consume human flesh. Would it be ethically justified in this case to, 
say, employ the military to blow up the bridges to an entire city, cutting it off completely to 
the outside world with a policy of shooting on site anyone who tries to escape? It may very 
well be ethically justified, and I would argue it would be if it prevented the spread of a 
disease which was threatening the entire planet. Furthermore, in such extreme 
circumstances we as a society can still strive to uphold the principle of reciprocity to the 
best of our ability. Food drops and exit points through which individuals can get tested and 
let through if they are shown to be clear of the disease, could be ways in which to make the 
horrendous situation just that much better for those affected. It is an extreme example, but 
worth considering.  
Whilst ethical disease control involves upholding a whole host of ethical principles, 
sometimes the reality of the situation calls for more drastic measures, in order to maximise 
utility and save more lives. Pragmatic concerns are very much a part of ethics and are the 
foundation of the use of quarantine in the first place. So how does the quarantining during 
the EVD outbreak hold up to ethical scrutiny? Well, it is hard to make a blanket statement, 
but insofar as the types of quarantining described by Gostin above: not too well. Though the 
quarantining of communities may very well have prevented the further spread of the 
disease and thus be justified, more could have been done to uphold the principle of 
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reciprocity. Food and medical supplies could have been transported in a controlled way 
through the cordons, to aid those inside. Individuals who have been reported as very ill 
could have been retrieved by properly protected medical staff, and brought to isolation in 
hospitals. If those inside the cordons were being quarantined to prevent the disease 
spreading and ravaging even more of the population, then much more effort should have 
been put towards ensuring these people were looked after properly and that the harm to 
them was minimised. That said, as we well know the healthcare infrastructures of the 
affected countries was poor and they may well have been doing all they could with what 
resources they had. The conclusion is: from an outside perspective it appears as though the 
quarantine methods they employed could have been better and they could have done more 
to uphold the principle of reciprocity.  
This subsection was a very brief look at the ethics of quarantine during the EVD 
outbreak. It is important that we can learn from situations like that discussed above, as until 
we develop better strategies, quarantine and isolation will be an important aspect of 
infectious disease control, especially during outbreaks. We can keep this case study in mind 
when looking at other cases of quarantine later.   
1.4 Conclusions: Lessons from the EVD outbreak and moving forward.  
 In this section we have looked at the West African EVD outbreak of 2014. We used 
the EVD outbreak as a case study to examine some of the ethical questions that can be 
raised in such scenarios, as well as critically assess some of the measures which were taken 
to control the outbreak. We took an in depth look at the ethics of the use of experimental 
treatment during the outbreak and highlighted some of the difficulties in addressing such an 
issue, which may not always be immediately apparent. Additionally, we had a quick look at 
the ethics of quarantine, notably how the carrying out of quarantine was very likely 
unethically conducted during the EVD outbreak. It is my hope that by looking at the EVD 
outbreak in some detail, and analysing some of the ethical questions it raises, we can now 
start to think about how the ethical conclusions we arrived at can be applied to other 
infectious diseases outbreaks. Armed with a real world sense of some of the difficulties that 
surround the ethics of infectious disease control, we can now begin to apply our thinking in 
a broader sense and to other scenarios. But, as we move forward into more theoretical 
territory: what of the EVD situation? How is the global health community moving forward? 
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 As of this writing, reported cases of EVD have dropped to zero. Human to human 
transmission of the disease has said to have ended in all three affected countries.53 The 
worst is over with respect to this outbreak and we can now look to how we can better 
manage such an outbreak in the future. For a start, with the outcome of the August 11th 
2014 WHO panel concluding that it was ethical to use experimental treatments during the 
EVD outbreak, there is now a very promising vaccine candidate. The WHO states: “Results 
from an interim analysis of the Guinea Phase III efficacy vaccine trial show that VSV-EBOV 
(Merck, Sharp & Dohme) is highly effective against Ebola.”54 This is very promising and it 
would seem as though viewing the outbreak as an opportunity to study the disease and 
develop treatment for it, has hopefully paid off.  
 The WHO published an article in January 2015 that outlined what needs to happen in 
2015 and what we can learn from 2014.55 Though slightly out-dated now, the article still 
offers many relevant commentaries as to what the global health community and the local 
health communities of those affected countries can learn from the outbreak. First, as we 
have already discussed, the global community has suffered a harsh lesson as to what can 
happen when poor countries with weak health systems receive a blow such as an outbreak 
of EVD: the healthcare systems collapse. This fact has sparked some, like Lawrence Gostin, 
to suggest the creation of a “WHO ‘Health System Fund’”.56 This fund would be used to 
rebuild and strengthen the healthcare infrastructures of those affected countries, as well as 
their at risk neighbours. It is clear that when considering potential future outbreaks, it may 
be of global interest to invest in developing poorer countries’ health care infrastructures, as 
this will help prevent future outbreaks from spreading across countries; from becoming a 
global pandemic.  
 Second, preparedness for a disease can make a substantial difference in defending 
against an outbreak. The WHO article lists the cases of Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali, who 
unlike the affected West African countries, were ready for the EVD outbreak (in no small 
part because their neighbours were already in the grips of an outbreak).57 This preparedness 
allowed the countries to prevent EVD from gaining a foothold in the population. The need 
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for preparedness may support calls from those such as Diamond et al. to create an “early 
warning system”, so that we are not blindsided by potential outbreaks in the future; or can 
at least make cost/benefit analysis judgements based upon the threat of various diseases.58  
 Third, we must take a multi-faceted approach when trying to control infectious 
diseases. No one measure or tactic will do it all, thus we must be ready to tackle the disease 
on multiple fronts. Furthermore, though this is not expressly mentioned by the WHO here, 
when we are taking a multi-faceted approach to infectious disease control, we must be 
aware that we are more likely we are to stumble into ethically treacherous areas, as the 
number of factors that need control and consideration increase. It is exactly when we intend 
on tackling the disease to the best of our abilities, that we must also be weary of neglecting 
our ethical analysis.  
 Finally, the WHO suggests that “community engagement is the one factor that 
underlies the success of all other control measures. It is the linchpin for successful control. 
Contact tracing, early reporting of symptoms, adherence to recommended protective 
measures, and safe burials are critically dependent on a cooperative community.”59 This 
boils down to the fundamental principles of transparency and reciprocity that are not only 
of ethical importance, but also pragmatic importance. A community will not comply with 
disease control measures if they are not actively informed and involved in the rationale 
behind the measures, and treated with due respect.  
These are just a few of the major lessons that we have learnt from the EVD outbreak 
in West Africa. Moving forward, it will be important to keep these in mind, as well as their 
real world context, as we move on to a more theoretical approach to the ethics of infectious 
disease control. 
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Section Two: Do the ethics of infectious disease control vary 
depending on the disease?  
2.1 Introduction. 
 After our discussion on the 2014 EVD outbreak in West Africa, it may be tempting to 
believe that we have learnt something ubiquitous when it comes to the ethics of infectious 
disease control, or something substantially profound. But I think we must be careful here, 
because this is not entirely the case. Though we have certainly learnt something substantial 
from the EVD outbreak about the ethics of infectious disease control and we may be able to 
apply some of these lessons to other cases (as we should), we mustn’t get complacent in 
believing we necessarily have a greater understanding of how to deal with any future 
infectious disease epidemic. Will the ethical conclusions we have arrived at in regards to the 
use of experimental treatment during an outbreak apply to all other infectious diseases? 
What about in regards to rhinovirus, the common cold? Would it be ethical to use 
experimental treatment if there was an outbreak of the common cold in a population? I 
think most of us would have the intuition that it is not okay to use experimental treatment 
during a rhinovirus outbreak. Why is this? Because of how the disease is spread, it’s 
commonality, or perhaps its lethality? Now this is an extreme example, the common cold is 
clearly a world apart from EVD; they are not really in the same league. Nonetheless, there 
are countless infectious diseases out there and we can know they present a range of modes 
of transmissions, severity, and so on. So, if we can imagine that there is a substantial 
difference in how we approach some of the ethical conundrums with regards to EVD versus 
rhinovirus, then we can imagine that there may be more subtle, yet nonetheless important, 
differences in how we approach some of the ethical conundrums with regards to diseases 
that are more similar to EVD, yet not identical.  
It is these differences I would like to examine in this section. I will be looking at some 
of the arguments generally put forward when considering the ethics of infectious disease 
control. I want to examine some general principles often discussed, such as the principle of 
reciprocity, and see how these fare when considering various factors of different infectious 
diseases. From here, I hope that an image may begin to form, of certain epidemiological and 
microbiological factors of different infectious diseases, which will play a major role when it 
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comes to considering the ethics of infectious disease control. Ultimately, the goal of this 
section is to perform some of the philosophical leg work required to support a flexible and 
adaptive ethical framework that could be applied to health care policy. More generally, I 
hope to show that we cannot take a ‘one size fits all’ approach when it comes to considering 
the ethics of infectious disease control. We must recognise that the differences in physical 
factors of infectious diseases will affect our approach to controlling the diseases in an 
ethical manner; more than may be first apparent.   
 
2.2 A starting point: the Andrew Speaker incident. 
 
I would like to start our discussion with a case study, which will be referenced 
throughout the rest of the paper. The case study asks what the government’s powers should 
be when it comes to restricting individual liberties in order to control the spread of 
infectious diseases. The case study is known as the “Andrew Speaker Incident”. I will be 
using Fidler et al.’s useful summary of the incident and the reader may wish to read the full 
article for a more in depth summary of the incident.60 All credit goes to the writers of that 
paper for the information provided in this case study.  
 In January 2007, a U.S. lawyer named Andrew Speaker went to the doctor to 
undergo a chest x-ray and CT scan, which revealed that he had an abnormality in his lungs. 
However, other concurrent tests were inconclusive so he underwent follow up medical 
testing in March. A diagnostic bronchoscopy revealed Speaker had tuberculosis (TB) and he 
was prescribed the standard first-line drugs usually used to treat TB. While Speaker’s tests 
(biological samples) were sent for further analysis in a laboratory, Speaker advised the 
Fulton County TB clinic that he had plans to go overseas in May and as such the clinic 
requested that the laboratory analysis being done on Speaker’s TB isolate be hurried. 
Samples were also sent to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to have additional testing 
carried out. Before leaving in May; Speaker, his private physician, and his family met with 
the Fulton County Health Department (FCHD) to discuss his TB infection. Due to the hurried 
laboratory testing, it had been revealed the day before that Speaker actually had multidrug-
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resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), which, as the name suggests, means that Speaker’s strain 
of TB was resistant to multiple of the first line drugs used to treat TB. Therefore, during 
Speaker’s meeting with the FCHD, he was told not to go travelling overseas. In the 
subsequent days the FCHD, Georgia Department of Public Health (GDPH), and the CDC 
began to discuss legal options for restricting the travel of someone with MDR-TB.  
        When the FCHD tried to locate Speaker, they could not find him. Unknown to 
anyone, Speaker had accelerated his travel plans and had already left on his overseas travels 
to Europe. As the CDC began attempts to locate Speaker in Europe, further testing came 
back that revealed Speaker in fact had extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB). 
XDR-TB is worse than MDR-TB in that Speaker’s particular strain of TB was not only resistant 
to multiple frontline drugs normally used to treat TB, but also resistant to many of the 
second line drugs used in the case of MDR-TB. This sparked a nation-wide border alert for 
Speaker.   
 The CDC eventually managed to track Speaker down in Rome and informed him of 
his XDR-TB diagnosis. They advised him not to travel on any international aircraft due to the 
threat he posed to other people. Despite Speaker indicating to the CDC that he would stay 
in Rome, he ended up flying to Prague and then to Montreal. When they discovered Speaker 
missing yet again, the CDC requested that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
prevent him from boarding any plane bound for the U.S. and they informed the Italian 
Ministry of Health as well as the WHO of the situation.  
 Eventually, on the 25th of May, Speaker drove back into the U.S. from Canada and 
despite the border guard being aware of the border alert; Speaker was let back into the 
United States. Eventually locating Speaker via cell phone in New York State, the CDC ordered 
Speaker to drive to a hospital where he would be put under federally mandated isolation. 
When he arrived at the hospital, Speaker was issued with a provisional federal quarantine 
order, the first issued since 1963. Now that Speaker was isolated and further testing and 
assessment had begun, the CDC began tracking down those with whom Speaker came in 
close contact, including those who flew on the same planes as him. This required major 
international cooperation.  
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 In the subsequent months, Speaker moved around a few hospitals for treatment and 
his story began to attract attention in the media. Questions were raised about how such an 
incident had occurred, what had gone wrong, and who was to blame. Furthermore, some of 
the passengers who travelled with Speaker from Prague to Montreal initiated tort litigation 
against Speaker. After surgery was performed to remove some of the TB from Speaker’s 
lungs, Speaker was eventually declared non-contagious at the end of July 2007.  
Controversy continued for long after Speaker was declared non-contagious. There 
were discrepancies in the testimonies of Speaker and the CDC. For example, Speaker 
indicated he was never told of the substantial risk he posed to other travellers prior to 
leaving the United States.61 Furthermore, later testing showed that his initial diagnosis of 
XDR-TB was false and he only had MDR-TB. The spotlight was on the CDC as to how such an 
incident could arise, posing a threat to thousands of individuals around the world. In this 
case, the world was lucky, but had the disease been more contagious and lethal, there could 
have been a real potential for a serious pandemic. The holes in public policy regarding 
infectious disease control were brought to the forefront and people began to think about 
the idea of mandatory isolation. The ethical questions of infectious disease control were 
brought into the public domain.  
2.3 The foundation of infectious disease control: the principle of reciprocity.  
 The Speaker incident clearly highlighted the importance of having effective 
infectious diseases control policy in place, in order to manage and prevent potential 
outbreaks. That said, beyond the simple pragmatics of needing such policy, how do we 
ensure we are acting in an ethical manner when enacting infectious disease control policy? 
It is this question we will turn our attention to now. In this subsection, we will begin with 
some of the more fundamental questions of the ethics of infectious disease control, and 
move on from there. There is no right or wrong place to begin when discussing the ethics of 
infectious disease control, but I will try to start where I think it is most intuitive, and go from 
there.  
I will begin our discussion with a paper that highlights some of the most basic 
questions in the ethics of infectious disease control and underscores the importance of 
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asking the question: “Is there a moral obligation not to infect others?”62  The paper covers 
three major points: do we have an obligation not to spread contagions, would such an 
obligation apply to, say, the workplace, and does the mode of transmission of the disease 
affect the ethics? We are not too interested here with the specifics of moral obligations not 
to spread infectious diseases in the workplace. I will view that particular question as more of 
an example, thus combining the first two points into one and start from there. While I think 
most of us would accept that it was immoral of Speaker to willingly risk infecting others with 
TB (assuming he indeed knew the risks), many may be more reluctant to say that it is 
likewise immoral to risk infecting others with the common cold. Yet I think we can all accept 
that to contract the common cold, is to be harmed (if not much less than with some other 
infectious diseases). Harris and Holm put it this way: “If communicating a disease is to inflict 
a harm proportionate to the severity of the disease and its consequences then the same 
moral obligation not to inflict such harm on others applies as much to disease as it does to 
other knowingly inflicted harms and applies as much in the social context as it does at 
work.”63 In order to move forward here, I think we must accept Harris and Holm’s claim that 
communicating a disease is to inflict harm. If one was to fall ill with any infectious disease, 
they have clearly suffered some form of harm. If the person transmitting the disease had 
not done so, the recipient of the disease would not have fallen ill and thus suffered 
accordingly. Putting fault or moral obligations aside (for now), we can certainly say harm has 
been caused. Perhaps an argument could be put forth against this claim (I couldn’t imagine 
one), but we will not try to justify this point further as the claim is not a big one and seems 
intuitively correct. So, to be the recipient of an infectious disease is certainly to experience 
something harmful and this harm will vary depending on the severity of the disease.  
So, if infecting someone with a disease is indeed to cause harm, how do we 
understand the blameworthiness of the vector (the person transmitting the disease) of the 
disease? What measures must one take in order to prevent the spread of an infectious 
disease? If we expect individuals to never willingly run the risk of infecting others with a 
disease, then it would seem as though some pretty extreme and medieval measures may be 
justified when it comes to preventing individuals from spreading disease. Yet this seems 
obviously absurd. I will paraphrase what Harris and Holm have to say on the issue. If 
                                                          
62
 Harris & Holm, Is There A Moral Obligation Not To Infect Others?   
63
 Ibid, pg. 1215. 
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
37 
 
someone contracts a cold or flu and this person works in an office space that is relatively 
tightly spaced, as many offices are, then that person can reasonably expect to infect one or 
two others when they go to work (or at least run a very high risk of this occurring).64 Yet, if 
the person were to stay at home they can completely avoid the risk of infecting others, but 
may suffer lost wages. This loss might be easily taken by some, but for others the loss would 
prove too great a financial burden. Are those who can afford to take time off work, and thus 
do so when ill, more morally responsible than those who do not? This would seem an unfair 
conclusion. How do we reconcile this situation? According to Harris and Holm, we look to 
the principle of reciprocity.65 Let’s think of it this way: on a subjective level, many of those 
who are infected with a cold may not particularly mind working whilst ill. Yet, if they did go 
to work and infect others at the place of work, the result may be others becoming ill, who 
do take time off work. Ultimately, this may result in a loss in revenue or efficacy for their 
place of work.66 Therefore the benefit of one staying home when ill may not be a question 
of direct harm to those they may infect, but it may also benefit those they actually work for. 
Therefore, society has multiple reasons to maintain an interest in keeping individuals who 
are ill with an infectious disease, at home. That said, if society doesn’t make it easy for 
individuals to stay at home when ill or inadvertently punishes them for doing so, isn’t the 
society just as morally liable as the sick individual for any harm that may be caused by the 
individual not remaining at home when ill? I would argue that it is. It is this thinking that is 
the basis for the principle of reciprocity: balancing an individual’s interests and 
responsibilities with that of the societies.  
If the principle of reciprocity is a solution to the above conundrum, then how exactly 
do we understand that principle? According to the above argument, there appears both a 
practical and moral reason for the idea that we cannot reasonably expect the individual to 
bear all the burdens and responsibility of isolating themselves when they are ill. A society as 
a whole benefits in multiple ways when an individual who is infected with a communicable 
disease isolates themselves; in many cases more than the infected individual. Therefore, we 
can reasonably expect that an ethical and pragmatic society would facilitate the isolation of 
the individual and aid in lifting some of the burdens borne as a result of isolation. So here 
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we have the principle of reciprocity: when an individual is a vector for an infectious disease, 
they have an obligation to refrain from spreading the disease to others and in turn the wider 
society should take responsibility for some of the burdens of self-imposed isolation. In other 
words, it shouldn’t be a particularly difficult choice for someone to decide to isolate 
themselves in the event they become a vector for an infectious disease, as the society 
should facilitate this course of action. Harris and Holm apply this principle specifically to the 
context of the workplace in their paper: “A strict duty to stay home from work when one is 
infected with the common cold or flu would create financial hardship for many people. It 
therefore follows from the reciprocity thesis that such a duty, if it were to be imposed by 
legislation or by the informal rules of a particular workplace, would have to be balanced by 
compensation for any loss.”67 It is worth noting here that it would be prudent to outline a 
probabilistic threshold to determine the necessity of an infected individual’s isolation 
(assuming the individual is physical fit and capable of work). If an infected individual carries 
an illness with a very low chance of infecting others, it may be more beneficial to both the 
individual and the employer to allow that individual to work. The main point here is that if 
the expectation is for the individual to stay at home so as to not infect others, this burden 
must be shared by society as well as the individual.  
We can see this principle in action in countries like New Zealand, which legislate that 
employers must provide employees with a minimum number of days of sick leave each year, 
for which they suffer no loss of pay and should not be penalised for in any way.68 Though 
this fact, and indeed the principle of reciprocity generally, may seem a trivial or even 
common sense moral act, the willingness for a society to share the burdens of those 
infected with a communicable disease, is a fundamental step when it comes to the ethics of 
infectious disease control. I would argue that the principle of reciprocity is perhaps the first 
moral principle to consider when it comes to infectious disease control. Furthermore, more 
complex and advanced principles are a natural extension of this fundamental principle. The 
balancing of the individual’s rights with the interests of the wider society while recognising 
the individual as a moral agent deserving of ethical treatment, is an important step in the 
ethics of infectious disease control. It was not too long ago that out of fear and a lack of 
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understanding, those infected with a communicable disease were treated with no regard for 
their own wellbeing, hence the saying “treated like a leper”.  
An additional point Harris and Holm make is regarding the mode of transmission of 
an infectious disease. They ask “Does the mode of transmission matter?”, when it comes to 
our obligations not to spread infectious diseases.69 Though the way it is framed in their 
particular paper is not too important for us here, the question of whether or not the mode 
of transmission of a disease affects our moral judgements, will become a major part of our 
ethical  discussions in this paper. Harris and Holm ask whether certain acts, such as sexual 
intercourse, convey more moral responsibility to the recipient of an infectious disease, than 
say, airborne transmission. That is: does willingly taking part in high risk behaviours make 
you more morally culpable than simply catching an illness from someone in the work place? 
Ultimately Harris and Holm seem dubious that one could make such a moral claim 
“Therefore the mode of transmission itself cannot form any basis for a sound moral 
judgement.”70 I agree with Harris and Holm here and am not interested in going into the 
details of the argument, as ultimately it will not impact our discussion that much. 
Furthermore, even if one argues that there is a certain degree of responsibility for both 
parties when it comes to high risk behaviours, the real question we are interested in here is 
of the duties of individuals not to infect others. It is a sound claim that even if there is some 
degree of responsibility one must take when engaging in high risk behaviours (such as 
unprotected sex); this doesn’t lessen the duty of those who have an infectious disease to 
not willingly put others at risk of infection. Regardless of mode of transmission, an individual 
with an infectious disease must take personal responsibility when it comes to not infecting 
others. Harris and Holm conclude: 
“The moral duty to behave responsibly and not knowingly put other people at risk is not a duty that is confined 
to HIV infection or to other life threatening diseases… It is, however, also a duty which we can expect people 
to discharge only if they live in a community that does not leave them with all the burdens involved in 
discharging this duty. The diseases we have discussed – the common cold and flu – are usually regarded as 
fairly trivial… If a duty not to communicate diseases can be established for diseases of this kind it will be a 
general duty, and not a duty limited to serious or life threatening diseases.”
71
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By examining Harris and Holm’s paper, we have established well-formed arguments for the 
moral duty one has not to infect others, not only in case of serious diseases, but also in the 
case of usually trivial diseases. Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, we have 
established the importance of the principle of reciprocity, a key principle to keep in mind as 
we move forward.    
2.4 Broadening principles: transparency, proportionality, and harm. 
 We now have what I consider to be the most fundamental principle of the ethics of 
infectious disease control in our moral arsenal: the principle of reciprocity. So how can we 
expand from here? Remember that in this paper we are interested with infectious disease 
control and, as we have learnt from our EVD case study, control often means isolation and 
quarantine. Not only are these means of control important during catastrophic outbreaks, 
but our day to day running of the healthcare system should include sensible measures of 
quarantine and isolation. Therefore, if we are to have a sensible moral approach to 
infectious disease control, we will need to consider ethical principles that aid us in such 
situations. Where can we go from the principle of reciprocity? 
Ross Upshur, who has written on the “Ethics and Infectious Disease” for the WHO’s 
website72 has also provided a useful paper on the “Ethics of Quarantine”.73 In regards to our 
question on quarantine and isolation, Upshur offers “4 principles that must be met in order 
for public health to contemplate an autonomy-limiting strategy”.74 Each principle, though an 
ethical point in itself, is tightly linked with the others, so we shouldn’t try to understand 
these principles as unique strategies. Rather we should view them as intended to work 
together as a complete moral framework. Let us now look at these principles and see what 
they have to offer. The first principle Upshur mentions is the harm principle. This principle 
suggests that in order for forced quarantine or isolation to be considered (an autonomy-
limiting strategy); there must be a clear threat of harm to the wider population, if the 
disease were to go unchecked. For example, in the case of EVD there is a clear risk of further 
transmission and thus harm if infected individuals are not isolated. However in the case of 
say, anthrax, an infected individual poses no risk of further transmission to other individuals 
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and thus isolation or quarantine is unnecessary. The principle seems to make intuitive 
sense: if we are to limit someone’s autonomy, a move that shouldn’t be taken lightly, we 
must firmly believe they pose a threat to the wider society, otherwise the limitation of 
autonomy is unjustified. The implications of the harm principle are far reaching and can 
offer much to an ethical framework. The principle raises two major factors which would 
seem to affect whether we deem a particular case of forced isolation or quarantine ethically 
justified. First, if we accept the principle, then we seem to have to accept that the degree to 
which we could consider autonomy-limiting strategies would depend on the potential harm 
caused by the disease itself; specifically it’s virulence. If a disease is highly lethal, then it is 
likely to be considered to do more ‘harm’ than if it isn’t lethal at all. This will determine 
whether we consider it justified to forcibly quarantine or isolate an individual in a particular 
scenario. For example: if someone is infected with EVD, then due to the virulence of the 
disease we may consider the potential harm it causes to be much higher than if they are 
only infected with the common cold. Therefore, we may consider it morally justified to 
isolate or quarantine someone in the case of EVD but not in the case of the cold (although 
remember according to Harris and Holm we may still criticise someone if they don’t self-
isolate in the case of the common cold, assuming the principle of reciprocity is met). So 
virulence seems to play an important role when considering the harm principle, especially if 
we wish to quantify the harm.  
The second factor that will play an important role when considering the harm 
principle will be the mode of transmission of the disease. When considering how much 
harm an unchecked disease could cause, we have to consider how that disease is spread. 
There is also a strong pragmatic element here. Consider a disease like influenza, which is 
spread through an infected person coughing or sneezing which sending droplets through the 
air or through the hands of an infected person coming into contact, directly or indirectly, 
with another individual.75 In other words, influenza is pretty easy to spread around and if a 
particularly lethal or damaging strain came about, we may conclude that the ease of 
transmission has the potential to infect many individuals if the disease is left unchecked; 
thus the harm principle is met. With the harm principle met, we have strong ethical and 
pragmatic reasons to consider forced isolation or quarantine of infected individuals. Now 
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consider a disease like malaria. Malaria is a vector-borne disease, meaning it is spread 
exclusively via an animal host, not directly human to human.76 Due to the nature of the 
vector, mosquitos, individuals infected with the disease pose no threat of spreading the 
disease to those around them and thus isolation or quarantine is unnecessary. The potential 
harm caused by allowing an individual infected with the disease to continue unchecked, is 
only to them, not to the wider society. Isolation and quarantine will have no effect on 
instances of the disease in the population, but protection from the vector has had proven 
impact on the instances of the disease.77 So we can see that whether or not the harm 
principle is met will also depend on the mode of transmission of the disease.  
 The second of Upshur’s principles is the principle of proportionality or least 
restrictive means. This principle “holds that public health authorities should use the least 
restrictive measures proportional to the goal of achieving disease control.”78 Thus, before 
considering mandatory quarantine or isolation, we should consider voluntary isolation 
options. This principle has both pragmatic and moral components. Practically speaking, if 
the risk is deemed low enough then voluntary isolation could be sufficient and fewer 
resources will be expended in the carrying out of a mandatory isolation or quarantine order. 
Morally, we see a strong adherence to the principle of reciprocity and the principle of harm 
in this principle. As far as the principle of reciprocity is concerned; if an individual is to have 
some of their autonomy removed in order to benefit the wider society, the society should 
allow that to be done voluntarily where possible, removing the harm that may be caused by 
the very process of forced isolation or quarantine. In relation to the harm principle, the risk 
posed to the wider society of the disease going unchecked may be low enough that 
voluntary isolation may be all that is necessary, so forced isolation would be excessive. 
However it must be kept in mind that this principle, in relation to the harm principle, may 
also swing in the other direction. Some illnesses may be so harmful or contagious and pose 
such a threat to the wider society, that the risk posed by any potential noncompliance with 
voluntary quarantine is simply too much. In these cases, it may be determined that the least 
restrictive means has to be forced quarantine and isolation in order to curtail a potentially 
catastrophic disease from spreading.  
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The third principle Upshur discusses is the principle of reciprocity, which we have 
already discussed and will skip over. The fourth and final principle Upshur discusses is the 
transparency principle. This principle is straightforward and is a key principle in many 
democracies, beyond simply infectious disease control. If some individual’s autonomy is 
going to be curtailed in order to protect the wider society, the justification and methods of 
this curtailing must be made clear by the body in charge of carrying out the orders. People 
should have a good idea of exactly why they are being, say, quarantined and what will 
happen to them. Information and support needs to be provided throughout the process and 
we can once again see the principle of reciprocity creeping in here. Practically speaking, the 
dissemination of information may increase compliance, as individuals will understand their 
civic duties if well informed of them. Ethically speaking, transparency will lessen the 
element of the unknown and thus the unnecessary fear one may experience if they are 
ignorant as to why they are being isolated or quarantined. By knowing what is going to 
happen to them and why, individuals affected by an infectious disease will be more at ease, 
which benefits both them and the bodies in charge of controlling the disease. 
 
From Upshur’s paper, we now have a greater understanding of some important 
principles when it comes to infectious disease control, specifically in relation to the issue of 
quarantine and isolation. Though many other infectious disease control strategies exist and 
ethical questions arise from them (think back to the question of the use of experimental 
treatment during the EVD outbreak), quarantine and isolation are two of the most basic yet 
effective strategies. Upshur summarises: 
“In summary, then, quarantine is a blunt instrument to use in the control of infectious diseases. However, in 
some circumstances it is one of the only possible means of responding to an infectious disease threat... 
However, public health professionals must continually update their information in order to refine the exposure 
criteria, so that people are not needlessly quarantined. Hence, communication between public health 
professionals and clinicians is crucial… Though many of these actions may be controversial, particularly when 
they begin to affect the livelihood of individuals, this is not an excuse for deviating from a control strategy. 
Transparency and communication are crucial in this regard.”
79
  
We saw the effectiveness of isolation and quarantine strategies in the EVD outbreak. 
Although there were certainly major gaps in the ethical justification of the strategies used 
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during the EVD outbreak (think of the “cordon sanitaire” strategies, mention by Gostin et 
al., which left many without food),80 we can see that when battling a disease that we know 
little about or have no effective treatment for, quarantine and isolation may be our two 
biggest weapons in fighting the disease. Furthermore, Upshur makes it clear that infectious 
disease control must be a multilateral effort, with all parties constantly updating their 
information and disseminating it amongst the other parties. Strategies are going to be multi-
tiered, from the health care professional on the ground, to the microbiologist working on 
treatment in the lab, to the epidemiologist studying the trends and patterns of the disease. 
A single tier or party working in discordance with the others will not effectively control the 
disease and may jeopardise the entire effort.  
 
2.5 Do the ethics of infectious disease control vary depending on disease? 
Now that we have a better understanding of some of the important principles 
regarding the ethics of quarantine, isolation, and infectious disease control more generally, 
we can turn back to the question that is the basis for this section of the paper: do the ethics 
of infectious disease control vary depending on the disease? Earlier I said we must be wary 
of generalising ethical conclusions that we have learned from the EVD outbreak. This applies 
to any disease outbreak; though we must analyse and learn from disease outbreaks, we 
mustn’t be too hasty to assume the same strategies will work in every case. We must be 
flexible and not make assumptions that what worked in one case will necessary work in the 
next case. I am hoping that by now the reader is beginning to get a strong sense that the 
answer to the primary question of this section of the paper, is ‘yes’. In this subsection I 
would like to apply the principles we have analysed so far to a few different diseases and 
see how our ethical conclusions may vary. I would like to note here that these principles are 
intertwined and often whether or not we adhere to one in a particular case will depend on 
whether we adhere to the others and in what way. All the principles relate to what is 
essentially a science: infectious disease control. As such they all depend on physical facts. 
One physical fact about a disease may affect our analysis of multiple ethical principles, this is 
exactly the point I hope to get across. It is therefore inevitable that whilst trying to pull apart 
some of these principles and examine them under different lights, I will not be able to 
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separate them perfectly and there will be overlap. So I will make my best attempt to ‘carve 
nature at its joints’.  
 If Upshur is right, then we must adhere to four principles when considering any 
autonomy-limiting strategy. I think we have established thus far that we have pretty good 
reason to accept Upshur’s argument, at the very least in the sense that some sort of 
principled moral guideline must be followed when restricting an individual’s freedom, 
regardless of whether we agree with Upshur’s principles specifically (I do and I think there is 
compelling reason to). Furthermore, I have already suggested that Upshur’s principles may 
extend beyond just quarantine and isolation; to many ethics of infectious disease control 
issues. Think back to the question of the use of experimental treatment during the EVD 
outbreak. Some of the “conditions” that were deemed necessary to meet were principles 
like ‘transparency’. We could no doubt gain some valuable insight if we applied the other 
four principles to the case as well.  
 Let’s first examine a disease we have already discussed and is right down one end of 
the ‘spectrum’ when it comes to harm: the common cold. We have examined in some detail 
how to apply the principle of reciprocity to something like the common cold, so let’s see 
how we fare when applying multiple principles to this disease. Let’s first ask the question: 
would we ever be ethically justified in considering autonomy-limiting strategies with regards 
to the common cold? It seems unlikely. First, let’s try to apply the harm principle to this 
case. What is the potential harm to the wider society if someone infected with the common 
cold is allowed to continue unchecked? The potential harm would be pretty minimal. The 
common cold is not lethal, does not require any medical treatment (other than to manage 
symptoms) and can normally be fought off by our immune system with relative ease. It 
poses no major threat to public health safety. Nonetheless it is an airborne disease and 
relatively contagious, therefore, as Harris and Holm pointed out, it poses a predictable risk 
of infection to those who come into proximity with an infected person, such as family, 
friends, and colleagues. Furthermore, individuals taking work off when sick can cost 
employers money, which is at least some form of harm. Maybe mandatory isolation is 
warranted?  
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Though the harm principle may be met at a minor level, there is still the principle of 
proportionality. Given the minimal amount harm the disease can cause if left unchecked, it 
would not only be a waste of resources but also unnecessarily harmful to the individual, if 
mandatory isolation measure were to be taken. Why not offer up the option of voluntary 
isolation? If individuals understand the potential harm infecting others with the common 
cold can cause, they may very well be motivated to isolate themselves willingly, out of a 
sense of duty. Are the risk that they wouldn’t choose to self-isolate and the potential harm 
caused by such a decision high enough to warrant intervention? Again, it seems unlikely. But 
we have one final principle to fall back on, just in case we do believe the risk is high enough: 
the principle of reciprocity. As already discussed, if we remove some of the burdens of self-
imposed isolation from the individual, they will be even further motivated to prevent the 
spread of the disease. Thus, if we provide the individual with an option such as paid sick 
leave from work, then we as a society have probably met our obligations under the principle 
of reciprocity. There will of course still be a remainder of people, who despite everything 
will still risk infecting others but we can again return to the harm principle; is the risk of 
harm to the greater society really significant at this point?  
Finally, the principle of transparency: how do we meet it in the above scenario? 
Well, so long as individuals know of their entitlement to, say, sick leave and their right to not 
be persecuted for taking it, then this principle and our societal obligations under it seem to 
be met. In this scenario we have deemed autonomy-limiting strategies unethical and 
unnecessary, so there is no call for transparency with regards to these strategies, as they are 
not being used. So we can see how Upshur’s four principles apply to a case of the common 
cold. What about more difficult cases? Furthermore, I would like the reader to keep in mind 
the question: what is it about the common cold that has led us to our conclusions in this 
section? Was it the low virulence of the disease, the way it can be treated, how it is spread, 
or perhaps a combination of these factors? How about the question of the use of 
experimental treatment in the case of the common cold? Would we arrive at the same 
conclusion as we did with EVD? These questions are going to help us in the creation of an 
infectious disease taxonomy that will be the centrepiece of the third section of this paper.  
 The next disease we are going to look at is TB. TB, like the common cold, is spread 
through the air. That said, TB has relatively low pathogenicity, the WHO suggesting “People 
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infected with TB bacteria have a lifetime risk of falling ill with TB of 10%.”81 However, 
individuals who may be infected yet not present with TB can still transmit the disease, thus 
we can imagine it may have a high inapparent infection rate, meaning many infected 
individuals would go undiagnosed. Finally, TB is much more virulent than the common cold, 
killing millions every year.82 At this point, we have introduced three major differences 
between TB and the common cold: pathogenicity, inapparent infection rate, and virulence.83 
How will this affect our application of Upshur’s principles and are some factors more 
significant than others? I will answer this question by comparing TB to the common cold and 
controlling for the various differences, thus allowing us to examine one physical factor at a 
time. First, let’s look at the pathogenicity of TB. Imagine if TB was identical to the common 
cold in that it had very low virulence, so was relatively benign. Would the decreased 
pathogenicity affect our application of Upshur’s principles in any major way? I would argue 
it largely doesn’t. If we can establish pretty low harm potential for the common cold, then 
the lower pathogenicity of TB would only further decrease the harm potential. If this were 
the case then we can more or less say of TB what we have already said about the common 
cold. What of the increased inapparent infection rate? This is intimately linked to low 
pathogenicity. Once again, we need to imagine that TB was just as virulent as the common 
cold but infected many without presenting symptoms. Once again, controlling for virulence, 
TB seems to pose no greater threat than the common cold and thus Upshur’s principles 
would seem to apply much the same. Isolation would still be recommended as a voluntary 
measure because, although the disease may not present itself in many individuals, its ability 
to nevertheless spread from those who are infected but show no symptoms would create an 
equal obligation of isolation (as the common cold) for those who actually do present with 
symptoms. No, it would seem as though the pathogenicity and inapparent infection rate are 
ultimately not hugely significant factors in determining the difference between TB and the 
common cold when it comes to applying Upshur’s principles. 
The most obvious significant difference between TB and the common cold seems to 
be the virulence of the diseases. Both are transmitted in the more or less the same manner, 
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yet one frequently kills its host while the other doesn’t. Therefore, if we are to apply the 
harm principle to TB in this case, we would find that the potential harm caused to a society 
by a TB infected individual continuing unchecked, is much higher than with the common 
cold. Indeed, this potential risk was highlighted by the Speaker incident. If Speaker had 
infected others during his travels we could reasonably expect that some of those infected 
may have eventually died, or infected others who subsequently died. The same could not be 
said if Speaker simply had the common cold. At the very least, the harm caused by the cost 
and length of TB treatment, is a significant difference between TB and the common cold. So 
we seem to have a stronger answer to the harm principle when it comes to TB.  
What about the proportionality principle? We can see that in the case of Speaker, 
health officials did instruct Speaker to refrain from his travels, offering Speaker the option of 
voluntary isolation. This would have been the least restrictive means, yet Speaker travelled 
regardless. Due to the potential harm Speaker could have caused on his travels, the option 
of forced isolation should have been on the cards for the relevant health professionals to 
order at their discretion.  
Finally, what about the principle of reciprocity? As we know, TB requires much more 
intensive treatment than the common cold. Therefore, there are strong pragmatic reasons 
to isolate individuals in a hospital or somewhere they can receive health care without 
running the risk of infecting others. What if they cannot afford healthcare? I would argue, 
that in the case of diseases like TB, society cannot expect individual’s to be isolated and 
simply left to die. Under the principle of reciprocity, if one is to isolate themselves and limit 
their autonomy, then one can expect health care treatment in return. This treatment should 
also include food and shelter, and offer as much as is feasible in order for the individual to 
maintain a ‘normal’ life. As for the principle of transparency, there seems to be little 
difference between the common cold and TB, in the sense that transparency should be 
ubiquitous, it will simply be the content of the information made ‘transparent’ that changes. 
With a cold the individual should know they have a right to take sick leave, with TB the 
individual should know their rights as well, but also understand clearly that due to the 
increased social risk they may be required to be forcibly isolated. So it would seem that 
when it comes to TB, due to the higher virulence and more demanding medical treatment of 
the disease, there is more ethical grounding to support the forced isolation and quarantine 
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of an individual (so long as all of Upshur’s principles are met). Though it is difficult to carve 
nature at its joints, it would seem as though the most significant difference between the 
common cold and TB, when it comes to our ethical conclusions, is the virulence of the 
diseases. Though other factors certainly play a role, the virulence of the diseases makes the 
biggest difference.  
 Moving forward, let us now continue to control for virulence, to see if we can arrive 
at any other morally significant differences between infectious diseases. I would like to look 
at the mode of transmission. Let’s take a look at bubonic plague. The bubonic plague is 
arguably more virulent than TB, but we only need to accept that both have the ability to 
cause death and are very serious illnesses. Furthermore, some types of plague, like 
pneumonic, can spread via the air from person to person, so we need to focus on bubonic 
plague, which is spread via the bite of fleas.84 So for our purposes, the significant difference 
between TB and bubonic plague is the mode of transmission: TB is spread through the air 
and plague is spread through fleas. Let us also say that most other factors are more or less 
equal, simply for the thought experiment at hand. We found that there could be good cause 
for the isolation of individuals with TB; will we find the same for individuals infected with 
bubonic plague? There are strong moral and practical reasons to suggest not. Ethically 
speaking, the harm principle appears not to be met in the case of bubonic plague. An 
individual infected with bubonic plague poses no consistent risk to those around them and a 
lack of treatment is only going to cause harm to the infected person. The difference in the 
human to human spread between the diseases is that spread is done directly with TB but 
done via fleas with bubonic plague. Therefore, physical isolation is of no use when it comes 
to bubonic plague, as infected fleas can still transmit the disease. However, awareness and 
targeting of the potentially infected fleas is of great use. Without the harm principle being 
met for bubonic plague (in order to justify isolation or quarantine), we cannot expect the 
other principles to fall into place either. That said, this does not eliminate all ethical 
quandaries for the case of bubonic plague. Small animals potentially infected with plague, 
maybe a necessary food in some parts of the world, could be outlawed from being eaten or 
sold during outbreaks, perhaps even permanently. This would apply the harm principle in a 
different manner; not in relation to the question of quarantine and isolation, but in relation 
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to the question of prohibition. Allowing individuals to buy and sell potentially infected small 
animals may allow further spread of the disease to continue, thus sufficiently fulfilling the 
harm principle. Only in this case the harm principle may justify the banning of certain forms 
of meat, or may even call for the culling of certain animals. Here we have a perfect example 
of something I said earlier: Upshur’s principles don’t simply apply to the matter of 
quarantine and isolation. We can now see different ethical outcomes between TB and the 
bubonic plague, which result from a difference in mode of transmission. If we see different 
ethical outcomes due to mode of transmission in the case above, then we have no reason to 
doubt it will occur in relation to varying other diseases, all with varying modes of 
transmission.  
 In this subsection I hope to have shown strong evidence that the ethics of infectious 
disease control vary greatly depending on the biological features of the disease itself. 
Furthermore, certain biological features of a disease may impact our conclusions, upon 
applying Upshur’s principles, more than other features. Though this is hardly a definitive 
outcome, I have already suggested that virulence and mode of transmission may have a big 
role to play when it comes to our ethical judgements of infectious disease control. By 
looking at several different diseases, we have gained some practical understanding of 
exactly how virulence and mode of transmission may affect our ethical judgements when it 
comes to infectious disease control. However, I would like to suggest that there is 
something further missing here. In the first section of the paper I said EVD is a “stage three” 
disease as identified by Wolfe, Dunavan, and Diamond.85 Ultimately, this fact had a large 
influence on the WHO’s decision to consider the use of experimental treatment ethically 
justified during the outbreak (though they don’t directly refer to it as I do). Recall the quote: 
“The only way of obtaining evidence on the safety and efficacy of any intervention in Ebola 
virus disease is during an outbreak, because identified sporadic disease is very rare.”86 This 
fact, that we can only study EVD interventions in humans during an outbreak, is a direct 
result of the disease being a stage three disease. Furthermore, we can wonder whether the 
same conclusion would be reached if the disease wasn’t a stage three disease; I don’t think 
it would have been.   
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2.6 The missing link: the evolutionary stages of diseases. 
 The title of this subsection may be a bit histrionic, but I believe it fitting for this point 
in the paper. So far we have examined some of the ethical difficulties that the 2014 EVD 
outbreak provided and analysed the discussion that surrounded these difficulties. We have 
looked in detail at some of the founding principles that underlie the ethics of infectious 
disease control and tested these principles in different situations. Finally, we have begun to 
realise that the biological features of infectious diseases have a profound impact on what 
we deem to be ethical courses of action when it comes to controlling the infectious 
diseases. We have a couple biological feature candidates that look promising so far: 
virulence and mode of transmission. We have examined how these two factors may impact 
our application of Upshur’s ethical principles. All of that said there is a subtle, yet important, 
gap which was illustrated in the case of the use of experimental treatment during the EVD 
outbreak. Though I have attempted to lead to this conclusion as naturally as possible, I will 
have to take a leap here and simply offer the theory up. That theory is outlined by Wolfe, 
Dunavan, and Diamond in their paper “Origins of major human infectious diseases”.87 In this 
subsection I will outline the theory and suggest why it is of ethical significance.88 
 The paper examines 25 major infectious diseases, analyses and categorises them 
into the five evolutionary stages, and distinguishes them into “Old World” and “New World” 
diseases, as well as “Temperate” and “Tropical” diseases.89 Though the “Old World” vs. 
“New World” and “Temperate” vs. “Tropical” distinctions will be of no major significance for 
our purposes, the five evolutionary stages will be. Wolfe et al. selected their 25 major 
infectious diseases with the aim being “…to select well-defined diseases causing the highest 
mortality and/or morbidity and hence of the highest historical and evolutionary 
significance.”90 The evolutionary stages mark the “transformation of an animal pathogen 
into a specialized pathogen for humans.”91 Furthermore, “There is no inevitable progression 
of microbes from Stage 1 to Stage 5: at each stage many microbes remain stuck, and the 
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agents of nearly half of the 25 important diseases we selected for analysis have not reached 
Stage 5.”92 I have summarised what the five stages are below: 
- Stage 1: The disease is found in nonhuman animals, but has not been found in 
humans in natural conditions. 
- Stage 2: The disease is found in nonhuman animals and has been transmitted from 
animals to humans, but not between humans. 
- Stage 3: The disease is found in nonhuman animals and has been transmitted from 
animals to humans and between humans. However, the disease only undergoes a 
few cycles of ‘secondary’ transmission.93 Therefore Stage 3 disease outbreaks tend 
to die out naturally in human populations.  
- Stage 4: Same as Stage 3, except the disease can sustain long sequences of 
secondary transmission, thus remaining in the human population for much longer 
than stage 3 diseases (sometimes they remain in the human population 
permanently).94 
- Stage 5: The disease is exclusive to humans.   
 
Wolfe et al. categorise the 25 major infectious diseases into each evolutionary stage in their 
supplemental notes, but I will provide examples in a table in section three of this paper. The 
stages are visualised nicely in the figure on the next page, taken from Wolfe et al.’s paper:      
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Figure 1 | Illustration of the five stages of the evolution of pathogens from exclusive to non-human animals, to 
exclusive to humans. The four agents depicted have reached different stages in the process, ranging from 
rabies (still only acquired directly from animals) to HIV-1 (now transmitted purely between humans).
95
 
 
  
At this stage the reader should have a good enough understanding of Wolfe et al.’s 
theory of evolutionary stages of infectious diseases. Reading the article itself would of 
course further aid this understaning. Now we can look at the ethical implications of the 
evolutionary stages. Stage 1 diseases have not yet been transmitted from animals to 
humans, so the ethical implications of such diseases are limited, at least as far as our 
discussion here goes. Of course one important point must be made, which Wolfe et al. 
suggest: by monitoring diseases found in animals, especially in areas where animals come 
into close contact with humans, we can develop an “early warning system” so that we don’t 
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blindsided by novel infectious diseases. Wolfe et al. elaborate “Monitoring of people, 
animals, and animal die-offs will serve as an early warning system for disease emergence, 
while also providing a unique archive of pathogens infecting humans and the animals to 
which we are exposed.”96 The monitoring of all diseases, not just those found in humans, 
will inevitable improve our preparation and understanding of diseases that may pose a 
human threat sometime in the future. So concerns surrounding stage 1 diseases may, 
strictly speaking, be more pragmatic than ethical. 
Stage 2 diseases can be transmitted from animals to humans but not between 
humans, therefore there will be no question of quarantine or isolation here despite the 
virulence of some of these diseases (e.g. anthrax). This example makes it pretty clear how 
the evolutionary stage of an infectious disease will play a big role in how we judge ethical 
actions. Previously, we noted that highly virulent diseases usually fulfil the principle of harm 
better than low virulence diseases. Yet, this analysis is affected even further by the 
evolutionary stage of the disease: there can be no question of harm caused to the wider 
society if the infected individual was left unchecked, as they physically cannot spread the 
disease to other humans. Once again, ethical questions of the type we are interested in here 
will be few and far between when considering Stage 2 diseases. There will be concerns 
similar to that raised by Stage 1 diseases such as: the monitoring of diseases in animals in 
order to increase our understanding of, and preparedness for, such diseases could be 
advisable. In addition, an increased understanding of how the disease presents itself in 
humans may aid in our understanding of the disease’s potential to begin secondary 
transmission between humans. This is one of the key areas Wolfe et al. consider us to have 
little understanding of: “Less well understood… is the transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 and 
4…”97 There may also be ethical questions as to whether or not the prohibition, temporary 
or permanent, of certain animal products in certain areas may be warranted. Though this 
may affect peoples’ livelihood, the risk of transmission of the disease from particular animal 
products to humans, may be significant enough during particular outbreaks of the disease. 
Though many animal products can be treated, this scenario isn’t entirely unlikely.  
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Stage 3 diseases can maintain a few cycles of secondary transmission between 
humans. These diseases, like EVD, offer unique problems of their own. First of all, due to 
their ability to be transmitted between humans, the issue of quarantine and isolation arises. 
Whether or not the measures are justified will depend on the particular disease, as well as 
factors like virulence and mode of transmission. Second, as with EVD, these diseases often 
only undergo a few cycles in humans before disappearing back to their reservoir host.98 99 
This means there is often a limited window of opportunity to study the disease and 
potential treatments, in humans. As the WHO found, this may strengthen the claim that the 
use of experimental treatments is justified because it is not often the opportunity to learn 
about the efficacy of such treatments in humans arises.100 A final issue is how we view these 
diseases in broad terms. Of course, when outbreaks occur we need to react to them and 
offer help to those affected by the diseases. Beyond that however, we need seriously to 
consider the destabilising threat of such diseases. When we think about hugely destabilising 
infectious diseases, ones that have had a massive impact around the globe, Stage 3 diseases 
do not always come to mind. This is directly due to their nature of not being able to 
maintain multiple cycles of human to human transmission. Ultimately whether or not this 
fact is of much significance is something to be decided and thought about by policy makers, 
but it is still worthwhile mentioning.  
 Stage 4 diseases maintain long and sustained cycles of secondary transmission 
between humans and pose many difficulties. Stage 4 diseases, like influenza, can maintain 
transmission between humans for greatly extended periods of time and as such, have the 
potential to cause significant damage to civilian infrastructure. Of course, as with EVD, there 
will be questions of isolation and quarantine when it comes to Stage 4 diseases. However, 
due to the fact that Stage 4 diseases don’t tend to disappear back into the reservoir host 
after a few cycles, more permanent strategies will be preferable when dealing with Stage 4 
diseases. By this I mean development of effective treatment is very important. Although 
there may be a call for the use of experimental treatment during particularly bad outbreaks, 
                                                          
98
 A “reservoir host” is a place the disease persists for long periods of time, usually inside the body of an animal 
although sometimes in environmental bodies such as water. In animals, the reservoir host is usually unaffected 
by the disease, or at least not killed by it, as this would make it’s persistence in the particular species of animal 
unviable.  
99
 Obviously it is not as if the disease physically “retreats” back to its reservoir host: it is always there. Simply, 
due to its inability to maintain more than a few cycles in humans, it can disappear from humans altogether, yet 
continue to persist in the reservoir host. 
100
 WHO, Ethical considerations for use of unregistered interventions for Ebola viral disease, pg. 4.  
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
56 
 
due to the persistence of these diseases in the human population, there is not a substantial 
urgency required to rush the development process, as opposed to the 2014 EVD outbreak. 
There isn’t as much of a limited window of opportunity. It may even be unethical to use 
experimental treatment during the normal levels of occurrence of Stage 4 diseases due to 
the potential harm they may cause (depending on the circumstances). Because of their 
ability to be ‘reseeded’ into the human population from the reservoir host and their ability 
spread between humans for extended periods of time, Stage 4 diseases are arguably some 
of the worst we know of. Thus, ethical considerations will be many and may change quite 
dramatically on a case by case basis.  
Stage 5 diseases are found only in humans. Due to this fact, we have had some 
success in eliminating these diseases from the population, as they have no reservoir host to 
‘retreat’ to. Once again there will be questions of isolation and quarantine with Stage 5 
diseases. These diseases pose another interesting ethical question: should vaccination 
against such diseases be mandatory?101 The eradication of Smallpox in 1980 due to an 
immunization campaign led by the WHO highlights the major benefits that can arise from 
widespread vaccination against Stage 5 diseases.102 Unlike all the diseases covered 
previously, Stage 5 diseases don’t have animal or environmental reservoir hosts, therefore 
sufficient prevention of spread between humans can see the disease eradicated for good, 
without a fear of re-entry into the population. This fact raises the question: when a safe and 
accessible vaccine has been created for such diseases, should the vaccine be mandatory? If 
the vaccine was made accessible to all individuals who are viable candidates, it is hard to see 
what motivation individuals would have to not vaccinate, thus mandatory vaccination seems 
unnecessary. However, the recent anti-vaccination movement and subsequent increase in 
preventable illnesses has shown that people can be easily corrupted by a poor 
understanding of science.103 Furthermore, if vaccination only benefited the person receiving 
the vaccine, the question may be null and void. That is not the case though; widespread 
vaccination creates ‘herd-immunity’, protecting those who cannot be vaccinated as well as 
those that can. Additionally, if the vaccination doesn’t have a 100% success rate then the 
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more individuals that are vaccinated, the less chance there is of the disease spreading from 
someone for whom the vaccine hasn’t worked, to another individual for whom the vaccine 
hasn’t worked. Ultimately, I would argue mandatory vaccination will more often than not be 
ethically justified if in a pathogen had sufficient capability to widely affect a large 
population. Admittedly this is relatively vague, which is a reflection of the issues at hand: 
they are not clear cut. An example of a scenario in which mandatory vaccination was 
ethically justified might be a strain of diphtheria that is highly virulent, and has a high 
infectivity/pathogenicity, but is not currently being well controlled, leading to many deaths. 
If there was an effective vaccine available, mandatory vaccination would be justified in such 
a situation (although I think people would be very willing to vaccinate in this scenario). So 
we can see that, as well as many of the questions raised by diseases of other evolutionary 
stages, Stage 5 diseases offer unique ethical problems of their own.  
In this subsection we have examined Wolfe et al.’s theory of evolutionary stages of 
diseases. We have looked at each stage and suggested some of the unique ethical dilemmas 
posed by diseases in each stage. I hope to have made a strong case for the idea that, like 
virulence and mode of transmission, the evolutionary stage of a disease has a big impact on 
how we deal with some of the ethical dilemmas posed by different infectious diseases.  
 
2.7 Summary 
 
So far in this paper we have achieved several things. First, by looking at the case of 
the 2014 EVD outbreak in West Africa, we have obtained a real world sense of some of the 
ethical challenges the issue of infectious disease control poses. Additionally, we now have 
an in depth understanding of a real and significant example of an infectious disease 
outbreak, which we can draw upon throughout this thesis. Second, we have taken a ground-
up approach to the ethics of infectious disease control. Starting with the paper by Harris and 
Holm and moving on to Upshur’s paper, we unravelled some of the ethical grounding for 
several core principles of the ethics of infectious disease control. We examined how the 
application of these principles is altered dramatically depending on some key biological 
features of diseases. By looking at various infectious diseases and how they differed from 
one another, we came to understand how dramatically the ethical problems and outcomes 
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changed based upon features like virulence and mode of transmission. Finally, as an 
important last piece of the puzzle, we looked at Wolfe et al.’s paper on the evolutionary 
stages of major infectious diseases. The theory offered another important biological feature 
of infectious diseases, which dramatically impacted how we deal with the various, and 
different, ethical issues raised by different diseases. By this point in the paper we should 
ultimately have a strong sense of how the virulence, mode of transmission, and evolutionary 
stage of a disease can have massive implications on how we apply well founded ethical 
principles to that disease, in a certain scenario. Now, we are ready to put what has been 
learnt so far into practice and develop a type of ‘infectious disease taxonomy’ that will 
provide the basis for an ethical framework to be used in infectious disease control. 
  
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
59 
 
                Section Three: A Disease Taxonomy Ethical and Policy 
Implications. 
3.1 Introduction. 
Now that we have a strong basis for the claim that biological features of a disease 
have a major impact on our ethical and pragmatic approach to the disease, we can utilise 
this information. In this section of the paper I will present a disease taxonomy drawing upon 
the virulence, mode of transmission, and evolutionary stage of the disease. I will start by 
discussing the current approach taken to infectious disease control in New Zealand (NZ) and 
discuss some of the potential shortcomings of the approach. Then I will present the disease 
taxonomy itself and briefly describe it. From this I will outline the major categories (or 
‘cells’) the disease taxonomy entails and discuss some of the ethical implications for each 
category. I will conclude by suggesting how such a taxonomy could be used to guide the 
ethics infectious disease control policy. It will be made clear that my intention is not to 
suggest that current infectious disease control policy is fundamentally flawed or that my 
disease taxonomy is better; I have neither the resources nor the intricate understanding of 
the bureaucratic processes to do so. I am a moral philosopher. What I hope to make clear is 
that my disease taxonomy is an ethical suggestion, intended to offer a potential route of 
further investigation that could lead to an improvement in infectious disease control policy. 
The taxonomy in its current form is not intended to replace current policy, but perhaps 
supplement it, or provide an incentive to further research the potential use of such a 
taxonomy.  
A final note is that my intention in this paper is by no means to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the multitude of ethical questions surrounding infectious disease 
control. So far the paper raises as many questions as answers - this is my intention (although 
I still hope to have found some solid ethical conclusions, grounded in reasoned argument). I 
have tried to illustrate the intricate relationship between ethics and pragmatics and I have 
indeed suggested that any serious ethical theory will accommodate practical concerns: 
ethicists should not conduct their work locked in ivory towers. Therefore, I respect those 
whose job it is to arrive at conclusions to many of the ethical questions raised throughout 
this paper and though I am willing to offer up suggestions, I will acknowledge their expertise 
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when it comes to answering such questions. My taxonomy does not look to answer all the 
ethical questions it poses, but rather looks to direct further ethical discussion on the issues 
raised in a clear and precise manner. That is to say, the intention of the taxonomy is to 
hasten the ability of whoever may be interested, to ask and thus answer the most pertinent 
and relevant questions in relation to the ethics of infectious disease control. It is a road map 
to aid in the understanding of the landscape of the ethics of infectious disease control; a 
tool to be used to clarify and hopefully simplify the ethics of infectious disease control. The 
work of the paper so far has been to provide the practical and theoretical groundwork for 
the development of such a tool. 
3.2 Current approach to infectious disease control in New Zealand. 
 The management of infectious disease control strategies in New Zealand, particularly 
in the event of a potential outbreak, is covered by five pieces of key legislation: 
1) The Health Act 1956. 
2) Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 1966. 
3) Health (Quarantine) Regulations 1983. 
4) Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
5) The Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006.104 
Each piece of legislation contributes crucial legal backing in a particular area, in order to aid 
in the overall process of infectious disease control. Together, the statutes achieve several 
goals. First, they give the government the necessary statutory power to effectively respond 
to potential epidemics. For example, the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 outlines the 
special powers conveyed to the prime minister in the event of an infectious disease 
outbreak.105 Second, the statutes work together to outline the rights of those who may be 
impacted by infectious disease control measures, especially in the case of quarantine and 
isolation. For example, the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 1966 
outline the limitations of healthcare professionals’ power to isolate individuals, including 
the length of isolation. Finally, the statutes together provide a clear set of expectations and 
limitations in advance of any potential infectious disease outbreak, thus the processes 
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involved in controlling the outbreak are transparent. As we have already discussed, the 
principle of transparency is a key principle to adhere to when utilising infectious disease 
control strategies, both for its ethical and pragmatic implications.  
 In addition to the legislation that provides the legal backing for both individual rights 
and governmental powers during various stages of infectious disease control, there are also 
a couple of important, non-legislation documents when it comes to infectious disease 
control in NZ. These documents are: 
1) The National Ethics Advisory Committee: Ethical Values for a Pandemic.106 
2) Ministry of Health: Influenza Pandemic Plan.107 
What these documents cover is pretty indicative from their titles. They provide information 
and guidelines to those who will be on the frontline when responding to any epidemic such 
as medical staff, emergency services, community workers, and so on. They outline measures 
through which such individuals and the wider community can prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from an epidemic, whilst maintaining high ethical standards. The core purpose of 
these documents is outlined well in the Influenza Pandemic Plan: 
“It is important to note that ethical considerations are broader than the legislation suggests, and that the law 
is silent on many issues raised in pandemic planning. In addition, the law is often slow to follow moral change 
in the community, so older legislation may not necessarily reflect a community’s current ethical values.”
108
  
In this quote we can already begin to see the necessity for ethical frameworks, such as that 
which will be provided in this paper, to plan for issues that aren’t covered by the law. 
Moving forward, it is important to keep in mind that the Ministry of Health’s “Influenza 
Pandemic Plan” is exactly that: a plan in the eventuality of an influenza pandemic. Of course 
this is a sensible plan to have written, but as we have already seen we cannot necessarily 
expect the ethical guidelines outlined in this plan to apply to different infectious diseases. 
The issue of key biological differences between infectious diseases is not addressed in The 
National Ethics Advisory Committee’s Ethical Values for a Pandemic either, although the 
example scenarios provide a great ethical basis for general behaviours that should be 
encouraged during an infectious disease outbreak. The only writing I could find that 
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Preparation: 
Utilization of frameworks such as those set up in the Influenza Pandemic Plan. Monitoring of 
diseases and communication within the health sector is used to stay ahead of any potential 
epidemic. Incidences of notifiable diseases listed in Schedule 2 of the Health Act 1956 are reported 
to the medical officer of health, so any abnormalities can be quickly reported. Monitoring of disease 
spread overseas is utilised to predict a potential pandemic, and WHO advice is adhered to.   
highlighted the ethical importance of physical differences between infectious diseases, was 
the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 in which incubation times of diseases, and thus the 
appropriate isolation periods, was outlined for a decent number of major infectious 
diseases.109 Though this ‘list’ based approach is certainly very useful and most of the major 
diseases we might expect to occur in NZ are covered, there may be difficulties when dealing 
with novel pathogens and ethical questions beyond simply isolation and quarantine for the 
diseases listed. I hope my disease taxonomy could help strengthen, in some way, these 
measures that are already in place. Below I have outlined the process, based upon some of 
the documents I have already outlined, that would occur in the event of an infectious 
disease outbreak. The colours signify the severity of that particular stage in terms of threat 
to the NZ public.   
The Process of Infectious Disease Control in NZ:  
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Overseas Epidemic Alert: 
An epidemic is occurring overseas. Monitoring is very important and travel restriction may be 
necessary (1). If the outbreak is occurring in two or more countries in one WHO region, efforts to 
keep the disease out of the country must be taken, as suggested by the Influenza Pandemic Plan. This 
would require heavier than normal monitoring of activities at border ports. Local health bodies need 
to begin preparations for a potential epidemic by doing things such as: increasing protective 
equipment, creating more hospital ICU space, and taking staff through the procedures.  
First Cases in New Zealand: 
Upon arrival of the first cases in New Zealand, isolation of the disease and further spread 
prevention must be prioritised. Per the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 
1966, the Environmental Health Officers shall visit and assess the premises of the infectious person 
(S7a) and report his finding to the Medical Officer (S7b). He shall repeatedly visit and monitor the 
situation to ensure appropriate measures are being taken to prevent further disease spread (2) 
(S7). He will report to and be guided by the Medical Officer of Health (S7m) and may require 
occupants to remain in isolation for the period of time stated in Schedule 2 of the Regulations (3). 
Discretion is given to the Medical Officer of Health as to the terms of isolation and medical 
examinations to be carried out.    
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I have numbered and highlighted in red five major ethical problems that arise form 
the current process of infectious disease control outlined above. First is the issue of travel 
restrictions. In the early stages of a potential pandemic, when outbreaks have occurred 
overseas; travel restrictions in order to prevent the spread of the disease to NZ may be 
justified. However, there is no reason why Upshur’s principles couldn’t apply to situation. I 
have already stated I think the principles are applicable to more than just the issue of 
isolation and quarantine. Though it may not seem as much of a violation of individual rights 
Increasing Number of Cases in New Zealand: 
With the agreement of the Minister of Health, the Prime Minister may issue an epidemic notice 
as per the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 (S5(1)). The notice is to be issued if the Prime Minister 
believes the epidemic will disrupt NZ society. The notice will be instruction for Parliament to meet 
immediately (S6) and ensure government has sufficient power to coordinate a cohesive response 
to the threat, which will ultimately be led by the Ministry of Health. It will be at the discretion of 
Medical Officers of Health to quarantine and isolate individuals for the length of the incubation 
period outlined in Schedule 2 of the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 
1966(4). Upholding common ethical values, outlined in “Ethical Values in a Pandemic” will be of 
great importance to ensure continued social cohesion and wellbeing.    
Recovery Phase: 
Procedures to recover from a major epidemic are outlined in the “Influenza Pandemic Plan”. Steps 
are taken to prevent a resurgence of the disease, whilst planning is made to prepare for such 
resurgence. Restoration of normal services is important and schools may begin to reopen. Depending 
on the nature of the illness, a vaccine may be rolled out so risk of resurgence will decline as the 
population’s immunity increases (5). Services are created to aid in the recovery of those businesses, 
schools, and social groups who were hit worst by the epidemic. As strain on emergency services eases, 
hospitals can revert to normal operations.   
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as, say, quarantine or isolation; limiting one’s ability to travel is not something that should 
be done lightly. There should be clear evidence that the harm principle is met: that 
unchecked travel of certain individuals does pose a major threat to the wider society. 
Whether or not this harm principle will be met, will depend largely on the factors of the 
disease itself. For example, a malaria outbreak overseas does not warrant the prevention of 
persons potentially infected with malaria from travelling, but it may in the case of influenza. 
Whatever the case, the harm principle must clearly be met and the same goes for Upshur’s 
other principles. In the case of reciprocity: as much as is possible authorities should strive to 
offer alternative travel arrangements or recompense. Individuals caught out and unable to 
return to work, should not be allowed to lose pay or be otherwise persecuted by their place 
of employment. In the case of proportionality: if individuals can be advised to voluntarily 
refrain from travelling instead of being physically prevented from travelling, then this option 
should be considered first. Finally, in terms of transparency, authorities should make 
information regarding the current and predicted state of travel into, within, and out of NZ 
readily available and accessible.  
The second ethical issue I have highlighted is the duties of the Environmental Officer. 
It is important to note that the duties of the Environmental Officer shouldn’t be limited to 
monitoring individuals to ensure further spread is prevented, but should also include aiding 
the wellbeing of the infected individuals. This fits well with the principle of reciprocity; if we 
are forcibly isolating infected individuals, in their home or elsewhere, we should ensure 
these individuals are well looked after. This should be an important part of the 
Environmental Officer’s duties, or at least some other health care professional who comes 
into contact with infected individuals. The third ethical issue follows closely on from the 
second; if individuals are in isolation for a predetermined period of time, all of Upshur’s 
principles must be met. There must be a clear expectation of harm if the individual wasn’t 
isolated, the process and reason for isolation must be made clear to the individual, they 
should receive necessary medical treatment, and they mustn’t be punished in their place of 
employment. These points should all be intuitive conclusions by this stage in the paper.  
The fourth ethical issue highlighted is more or less the same as the third, except we 
must now consider the same issues for the case of quarantine. We must strive to once again 
meet all of Upshur’s principles. In many cases, because quarantine deals with individuals 
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who are not confirmed to be infected but are suspected likely being infected, Upshur’s 
principles must be even more firmly met: the evidence to support them must be 
substantive. In regards to the harm principle, we must have sufficient reason to believe 
quarantined individuals are of a high enough risk to cause substantial potential harm. To 
uphold the least restrictive means principles, quarantined individuals must, wherever 
possible, be advised to isolate themselves of their own volition before they are forcibly 
isolated. The principle of reciprocity can be met in a number of ways. Individuals must once 
again not be punished at their place of work because of their quarantine and individuals 
should not be put in a situation where they are at high risk of contracting the disease from 
other quarantined individuals. Furthermore, if they are confirmed to be infected they should 
receive adequate medical treatment, or not be expected to be isolated. As is always the 
case, there should be transparency about the entire process and individuals should be 
informed of their rights.  
The fifth and final ethical issue I have highlighted is whether or not vaccines should 
be made mandatory after such an outbreak. According to the Health (Infectious and 
Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 1966 ordering mandatory vaccination against smallpox was 
within the power of the authorities. Should we expect the same while recovering from any 
future outbreak? It would seem unlikely that anyone would refuse a free vaccination for a 
disease that has just caused an outbreak within NZ, but we must still consider the 
possibility. Once again, the answer would depend on whether Upshur’s principles are met 
by this course of action. The harm principle, like in the case of smallpox, may be clearly met, 
if the risk of unvaccinated individuals continuing to spread the disease is substantial. 
Reciprocity would include support for anyone who experienced adverse side effects from 
the vaccine, as well as time off work if needs be. The least restrictive means would suggest 
offering the vaccines for free at community centres before starting to monitor and force 
individuals to take their vaccine. Finally, transparency once again entails information be 
provided justifying the whole process.  
These five ethical issues I have outlined appear to be resolved by the relatively 
straightforward process of applying Upshur’s principles in each case. Though this is certainly 
a good start, I did not go into detail on how the biological features of the diseases would 
substantially affect our ethical conclusions in each of these cases. I think this provides strong 
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evidence for the need of a disease taxonomy, such as the one I will suggest, to be 
incorporated into the process of infectious disease control. Though it may be that some of 
the ethical issues I have raised are addressed elsewhere in legislation or documents, I have 
not managed to find definitive answers on these issues. Furthermore I haven’t discovered 
any suggestion that the biological features of diseases plays an important role in the ethics 
of infectious disease control. Though I do not doubt the relevant healthcare professionals’ 
ability to adapt to a variety of infectious diseases and scenarios, the ethical issues I have 
raised show a gap, in the policy surrounding infectious disease control in NZ. I hope my 
disease taxonomy may offer means by which to plug this gap or at least lead to further 
discussions that would do so.  
3.3 The infectious disease taxonomy 
 On the next page I have inserted my infectious disease taxonomy table. The colour 
coding creates groups of diseases that I think will have similar answers to certain ethical 
principles. The more dark red the colour, the more of a threat to global communities those 
diseases tend to be. I have also not included Stage 1 diseases, as those diseases have not yet 
been transmitted to humans, therefore there will not be any major ethical issues of interest 
for the purposes of this paper. I mentioned last section the imperative for research and 
observation to be done on these Stage 1 diseases in order to increase preparedness for 
potential outbreaks, but that is more of a pragmatic issue than an ethical one.   
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   Figure 2 | Infectious Disease Taxonomy Table. All figures have been taken from Wolfe et al.: Supplementary notes, pg. 4 (link in the references).
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Before continuing, I would like to make a couple notes about the table. First, the 
colouring of the cells does not necessarily indicate morally significant differences in the 
diseases. As stated earlier, the colouring is a general indication of the threat posed to the 
global community by the disease. It is certainly debatable how we define “threat” as many 
individuals, who should by no means be neglected, routinely die of the less ‘threatening’ 
diseases. That said, here I intend ‘threat’ to mean diseases that have the capacity to cause 
widespread damage to civilian infrastructure, the way that EVD did during the 2014 
outbreak. The colours are not meant to represent precise borders but are more meant to 
represent a general theoretical threat potential of diseases. Obviously, even diseases that 
are in the more red zones will not be as damaging if they have low virulence. Second, there 
are a couple cells which contain no examples. This is not because none exist, but because I 
haven’t thus far been able to confirm any diseases that fit into these categories. The 
evolutionary stage of a disease is not a commonly used categorisation tool for infectious 
diseases. Furthermore, the line between indirect and direct contact as modes of 
transmission, can blur. Diseases that can be spread through indirect contact have the 
propensity to be spread through direct contact as well, though not always. This means 
diseases like EVD, could actually fit into both categories, and thus fill both cells.  
So, in the table we can see infectious diseases divided by the three major biological 
features we have already discussed: virulence, mode of transmission, and evolutionary 
stage. Thus, in each cell will be diseases that are the same evolutionary stage and have the 
same mode of transmission. This intersection generates unique outcomes to varying ethical 
problems between the cells. We have discussed some of these outcomes already, in section 
two. In addition to the factors utilised in the table, we must also remember that there are 
several other key factors that may affect the outcome to various ethical problems, some of 
which we have mention already. Below is a list of some additional factors that are worth 
considering when discussing the ethics of infectious disease control, though may not have as 
large an impact as the factors used to make the taxonomy table.  
1) Pathogenicity/Infectivity: The more likely a pathogen is to cause (potentially) severe 
symptoms, the more precautionary we need to be when dealing with those who are 
ill. This will strengthen the claim of the harm principle being met for any particular 
illness: the more infective a disease is and the more likely it is to cause illness after 
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infection, the greater the risk an infected individual poses to the wider society. This 
will likely increase the ethical justification of cases of isolation and quarantine.  
2) Inapparent infection rate: If a disease has a high inapparent infection rate 
(infectious people don’t always present symptoms), this can be hugely problematic 
for epidemic control. Depending on the other features of the disease, this may 
increase the need for quarantine: there is an increased potential for those who have 
come in to contact with an infected purpose to not be aware that they have 
contracted the disease and are spreading it. Once again justified by the harm 
principle, quarantine may be required in order to test individuals who are at risk of 
having contracted the disease and confirm the cases.   
3) Immunogenicity: Whether or not a disease will produce an immune response, 
ultimately preventing future infection, can have a huge effect on how we control the 
disease. This may increase the call to push for vaccination development and it allows 
individuals who survived infection and are no longer contagious to assist with those 
who are ill, without risk of reinfection. In an extremely bad situation, such as that 
depicted in the film Contagion (2011), immunity could be a way of dividing the 
population in order to better control the illness: those who are now immune can 
carry out civic duties.110    
4) Point when contagious: Knowing at what point during an infection someone is 
contagious can be of great use in disease control. If someone is only contagious once 
symptomatic, as with EVD, then there may be less of a need for quarantine, as non-
symptomatic individuals will not be contagious (though may still need to be 
monitored). Furthermore, if someone is contagious well before or after they are 
symptomatic, more caution and quarantining, may be warranted.  
Ultimately, the taxonomy table and the additional factors all boil down to 
information. The more we understand about various diseases and their biological factors, 
the better we are able to deal with them physically and ethically. We can then better argue 
that particular courses of action for particular diseases fulfil Upshur’s principles, or that they 
don’t. Of course it could be said that much of this is already known about the 25 major 
diseases that Wolfe et al. examined and that make up a decent portion of the list of 
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infectious diseases in the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 1966. 
Furthermore, if we don’t know this information, then the taxonomy table seems to be 
useless. This is a valid concern, but I have a couple responses to it.  
First, although the current legislative approaches that utilise lists of diseases 
undoubtedly provide much in the way of understanding for the diseases included in the list, 
they do not get at the heart of what is causing us to arrive at the ethical conclusions that we 
do. This makes the list-based approach inflexible; struggling to deal with novel threats. 
David Fidler, Lawrence Gostin, and Howard Markel outline this frustration in relation to the 
Speaker incident: “The Speaker case exposed problems with federal isolation and 
quarantine authorities. For example, federal powers apply to a specific list of diseases, thus 
depriving the federal government of flexibility when responding to novel threats. The listing 
approach requires the president, for each new threat, to make the disease quarantinable 
through executive order, which is what transpired when SARS and fears of pandemic 
influenza emerged.”111 I argue that whilst comprehensive information of diseases is still 
needed when utilising my taxonomy table, it is more adaptive and quicker to deal with novel 
pathogens than simply having a list of known disease and what to do about them. In the U.S. 
each new disease has to be added to a list in order to exercise federal power. In NZ, this 
seems to be similar, with the lengths of isolation and quarantine determined on a disease by 
disease basis.112 The result is that novel pathogens would need to be added to such a list 
before substantial and effective action can be taken to mitigate them. By utilising the 
taxonomy table, or something like it, once a few biological features of an infectious disease 
were known, there is already a classification category in place to deal with ethical and 
pragmatic concerns.  
The second issue ties in with the first; a list based approach is not streamlined. We 
essentially wind up with as many disease categories as there are diseases, which in the case 
of NZ is at least 26 diseases.113 Under my disease taxonomy table, we only have 13 
categories which will not change even with the addition of novel infections (assuming the 
nature of infectious diseases doesn’t change). This allows for a much more reactive and 
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streamlined approach to infectious disease control. By focusing on the ethically significant 
physical differences between diseases, we can easily infer whether courses of actions 
deemed justifiable for one illness will pertain to another illness, instead of having to develop 
guidelines for each disease individually. This said, the best approach would probably 
combine both the list based approach and the disease taxonomy table. List based 
approaches have the advantage of providing in depth information that is relevant to each 
disease. The disease taxonomy is slipstreamed and offers more flexibility, increasing the 
ability to adapt to novel infections, whilst not putting all infectious diseases under one 
category of ‘quarantinable’. Combining the two approaches may provide the best strategy 
for infectious disease control.    
3.4 An ethical framework for the infectious disease taxonomy. 
 Based upon what we understand about the ethics of infectious disease control, what 
general ethical conclusions can we draw about each of the 13 cells of the infectious disease 
taxonomy table? I will go through each cell and outline some of the major points that we 
may consider ethically relevant for the diseases that fall into that category. I will try to focus 
on the ethical points that make each cell unique, not what makes them the same as other 
cells. Therefore, a bit of common sense and inference of certain points between cells may 
be necessary. I will start with the Stage 2 infections and move on from top left to bottom 
right of the remaining cells.  
Stage 2 Infectious Diseases 
Stage 2 illnesses are transmitted directly from animals to humans so the mode of 
transmission between humans is irrelevant. Questions of isolation and quarantine will be 
irrelevant as there is no human to human spread. Some of the major ethical issues 
surrounding such diseases may arise from animal control and animal product control. 
Though irrelevant for a disease like tetanus, which is found in soil, diseases like visceral 
leishmaniasis, which is found in dogs and rodents, may call for the possibility of culling 
groups of animals or preventing the trading of animals and animal products. Though first 
line protection from the animals that spread such diseases is probably the most ethical 
means of preventing the disease from spreading, outbreaks may become so bad that more 
extreme measures are required. If it is found that a population of animals poses a threat to 
Joshua McIvor, The Ethics of Infectious Disease Control. 
 
73 
 
a society, then the harm principle will be met for courses of action like the culling of the 
animals. The same may be argued for the prevention of trading in animal products, though 
the reciprocity principle would require adequate recompense for those who may lose 
sources of income as a result of the ban.  
Stage 3, Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 3, vector-borne infectious diseases are transmitted from animals to humans 
and between humans via an intermediary vector, such as a mosquito or flea. Due to the 
nature of spread by vectors, questions of isolation and quarantine are unlikely to arise. Once 
again there will be the issue of animal and animal product control. Additionally, the 
question of experimental treatment may arise. Like EVD, these diseases only undergo a few 
cycles of secondary transmission between humans, therefore the opportunity to test 
treatment interventions may only arise during outbreaks. However, a point to keep in mind 
is that with diseases that are not vector-borne, the benefit of something like vaccination is 
two-fold: the individual is protected and they are also removed from the pool of potential 
vectors for the diseases, thus likely saving others from the disease. This double sided benefit 
may not hold when the mode of transmission is, say, a flea. If a flea were to come into 
contact with an infected person and thus carry the disease, even if the infected person then 
receives treatment and is no longer susceptible to the disease, the flea can continue to 
infect others with the disease. Though widespread vaccination may ultimately lessen the 
pool of susceptible individuals so greatly that the flea will no longer have a viable target, this 
process will most likely occur slower than when a human is the vector for transmission. 
Therefore, the potential benefits from using experimental treatment may not be as big as 
with other categories of diseases and the risks associated with experimental treatment may 
outweigh the benefits. Due to this, investment in protection from the vector itself may be 
the safer and more ethical option.  
Stage 4, Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 4, vector-borne infectious diseases are also spread via vectors such as 
mosquitos or fleas, except they can maintain extended cycles of human to human 
transmission. This fact will may lessen the efficacy of animal control strategies such as culls, 
as the disease can continue to transmit between humans for extended periods of time. 
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Thus, the potential benefits of such measures are lessened compared to the harms caused 
to the animals and those who rely on them. This will in some cases make such courses of 
action unethical. Furthermore, due to the persistence of these diseases in the human 
population, our opportunities to study the effects of potential treatment interventions will 
be greater than just during outbreaks. Therefore, the imperative to use experimental 
treatments is going to be lessened, except in the case where outbreaks are exceptionally 
bad.  
Stage 5, Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 5, vector-borne infectious diseases will require similar ethical 
considerations to all vector borne illnesses. However, due to the lack of an animal or 
environmental reservoir, these illnesses can theoretically be removed from the human 
population through effective treatment or prevention. Therefore, the question of 
mandatory treatment comes to mind: if treatment can prevent the spread of the illness, 
then enough treatment may be able to eradicate the disease. That said, we have already 
highlighted the difficulties of controlling disease when they are vector-borne: isolation 
and quarantine isn’t effective. Treatment, if it produces an immunogenic response, may 
very well be effective in lessening susceptible individuals to a critically low level. 
However, treatment is sometimes expensive and time consuming, and a better strategy 
may be to enforce disease prevention measures in high risk areas. The mandatory use of 
mosquito nets in certain areas may dramatically impact the incidences of malaria, 
assuming of course they are provided to those who can’t afford them. This is the strategy 
employed by the WHO, with great effect: “Vector control is the main way to prevent and 
reduce malaria transmission. If coverage of vector control interventions within a specific 
area is high enough, then a measure of protection will be conferred across the 
community.”114  They report that “Between 2000 and 2015, malaria incidence (the rate 
of new cases) fell by 37% globally. In that same period, malaria death rates fell by 60% 
globally among all age groups, and by 65% among children under 5.”115  Cleary the vector 
control methods are working, thus there is solid evidence that mandatory vector control 
interventions would meet Upshur’s principles.  
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Stage 3, Direct Contact Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 3, direct contact infectious diseases undergo few cycles of human to human 
transmission and are transmitted via direct (skin on skin or sexual) contact between 
individuals. Isolation and quarantine, though theoretically effective, are unlikely to meet 
the harm principle for these diseases. Individuals with these diseases usually pose low 
risk to the wider society due to the mode of transmission. According to the principles of 
least restrictive means, self-regulation is normally sufficient for controlling the diseases. 
In the same way you cannot get HIV from someone through holding their hand or kissing 
them, diseases that require direct contact are not easily spread outside of intimate 
contact with the individual and will not be caught in passing. Due to this fact, offering 
experimental treatment to stem the spread of the disease is also unlikely to be 
warranted, as simple practices like safe sex can prevent the spread of these illnesses. 
Furthermore, stage 3 diseases only undergo a few cycles of human to human 
transmission before dying out, so the major threat of these diseases may arguably be the 
animals from whence they came. This may call for animal and animal product control. 
Due to the mode of transmission requiring the animal to also make direct contact with 
the human however, awareness of safe animal control practices may satisfy the least 
restrictive means principles before any more extreme measures would be considered.  
Stage 4, Direct Contact Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 4, direct contact infectious diseases will encounter many of the same 
problems posed by their stage 3 counterparts. The key difference is going to be stage 4 
diseases’ ability to persist in the human population for longer periods of time. Isolation 
and quarantine may be ineffective and focusing on the animal origins of the disease may 
not be enough to prevent the spread of the illness. Monitoring and tracking the disease 
may be the best option, as well as public health campaigns encouraging the safe 
practices required to prevent disease spread. The interesting ethical questions that relate 
to these diseases will relate to the section of Harris and Holm’s paper that covers modes 
of transmission.116 Whether or not we view individuals who contract these diseases as a 
result of engaging in high risk behaviours as equally morally culpable will greatly 
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influence how we deal with the disease in terms of societal norms. As I said earlier, any 
claim that those who engage in high risk behaviours must take moral responsibility for 
their actions will not negate the duty of those who are infected to not infect others. 
Furthermore, bestowing moral culpability on to those who engage in high risk behaviours 
and thus contract the disease from such behaviours, poses an intuitive conflict with our 
views of health care workers who frequently engage in high risk behaviour through their 
work. Ultimately, this cell of infectious diseases may not have much different to say in 
terms of ethics and policy, but more about ethics and social values/views.     
Stage 5, Direct Contact Infectious Diseases 
There are some examples of stage 5, direct contact infectious diseases in our 
table, unlike the prior two classes of diseases. Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) like 
AIDS are common stage 5 direct contact infectious diseases. Once again, questions of 
isolation and quarantine are unlikely to yield much. These diseases are exclusive to 
humans and so the imperative arises to try and eradicate them from the population. A 
point I haven’t mentioned thus far in the paper, is that the viability of achieving 
eradication can differ greatly between developed and developing countries. This is due 
to a number of social, economic, and political reasons, making it very difficult to 
implement worldwide disease eradication strategies. For example, HIV treatment has 
come a long way since it was first discovered and those living in developed countries who 
contract HIV an receive diagnosis early enough, can expect to relatively normal lives. Yet 
“Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region, with 25.8 [24.0–28.7] million people 
living with HIV in 2014. Also sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost 70% of the global 
total of new HIV infections.”117 Nonetheless, efforts to eradicate the disease will always 
pose ethical questions. Mandatory STI testing of sex workers, free or cheap 
contraception, and criminal charges for those who knowingly infect others with HIV are 
some of the ethical dilemmas that surround these diseases perhaps more than any other 
cell. I would maintain that so long as Upshur’s principles are met, most, if not all, of these 
actions are ethically justified. 
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Stage 3, Indirect Contact Diseases 
 Stage 3, indirect contact disease are the first of the cells we’ve examined to 
seriously raise questions of isolation and quarantine. Due to their ability to spread 
through bodily fluids, which can often remain on surfaces and still be infectious, these 
diseases call for isolation of those who are sick. The degree to which the harm principle 
will be met will depend largely on the virulence of the disease. As we discussed in section 
two of the paper, diseases with very low virulence, such as the common cold, don’t pose 
a major threat to society. However, diseases like EVD, which falls into this cell of the 
taxonomy table, do pose a threat to society - if left unchecked in individuals. Therefore, 
given Upshur’s principles are met; isolation and quarantine will often be warranted with 
these diseases. Furthermore, as we have already discovered with EVD, understanding 
and treating these diseases may call for us to make exceptions to our normal operating 
procedures and allow the use of experimental treatment during outbreaks. These 
diseases can and do spread rapidly and wreak destruction on civilian infrastructure, so 
the imperative to control, learn from, and prepare for these diseases during and after 
their relatively short lived excursions into the human population, is substantial.   
Stage 4, Indirect Contact Infectious Diseases 
 Once again, the major issue with stage 4, indirect contact infectious disease when 
compared to their stage 3 counterparts, is their ability to sustain prolonged cycles of 
human to human transmission. This means we can expect these diseases to be a 
persistent and prolonged issue within populations. While isolation and quarantine will 
certainly be justified for those diseases that are virulent or harmful enough, the use of 
experimental treatments shouldn’t be utilised under the same pretext as the EVD 
outbreak. We will often have an opportunity to study these diseases in humans outside 
of outbreaks. This also means long-term strategies will need to be incorporated to keep 
the incidences of such diseases low. For example, cholera can be transmitted through 
incorrect hygiene practices so the issue of whether or not, say, restaurants that infect 
their customers with the disease should face prosecution, arises (assuming the required 
hygiene practices are readily available). I would argue that this may be necessary. Failing 
to adhere to hygiene practice in a professional capacity seriously compromises the safety 
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of the general public. That said, under reciprocity the government should make it easy 
for everyone to be able to meet hygiene standards.  
Stage 5, Indirect Contact Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 5 indirect contact infectious diseases, like their stage 3 and 4 counterparts, 
are often easily spread around. Quarantine and isolation will be necessary when the risk 
of further transmission, and virulence, is high. The question of mandatory treatment and 
prevention arises, as with other stage 5 diseases. Another ethical question that arises is: 
should those infected with say, hepatitis B, not be able to work in certain sectors? It is a 
difficult question and not one to be brushed over. Hepatitis B “…can survive outside the 
body for at least 7 days. During this time, the virus can still cause infection if it enters the 
body of a person who is not protected by the vaccine.”118 This clearly poses a huge risk of 
further transmission, in some sectors more than others. Or perhaps the vaccine itself 
should be made mandatory. This is probably the more equitable solution. The risk of 
transmission and the possibility of eradicating the disease provide strong reason to 
support the ethics of mandatory vaccination in these cases, assuming Upshur’s principles 
are met.  
Stage 3, Airborne Infectious Diseases 
 Airborne infectious diseases are (usually) more contagious than indirect contact 
infectious diseases. Therefore the harm principle is usually even easier to meet for 
airborne infectious disease that are highly virulent, than indirect contact infectious 
diseases. Due to the likelihood of these diseases to spread with ease, quarantine 
measures will be more ethically justified than any of the disease cells examined so far. 
Individuals who may have come close to someone on, say, a plane, are much more likely 
to have contracted the illness than if the disease was spread through indirect contact. If 
the disease is harmful enough, quarantining those on the plane with a potentially 
infected individual would be warranted. Furthermore, as with EVD, diseases in this cell 
will likely flare up for relatively short periods of time. Therefore the ability to study the 
disease in humans during outbreaks is often the only opportunity. EVD would have been 
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much worse had it been an airborne disease and as such the use of experimental 
treatment would have been even more ethically justified, due to the harm principle 
being met much easier. All of this said, in theory these diseases shouldn’t persist for long 
in the population and so many of the goals will be short term: control the disease during 
outbreaks.  
Stage 4, Airborne Infectious Diseases 
 Stage 4, airborne infectious diseases pose an even bigger threat than their stage 3 
counterparts. They can sustain much longer cycles in the population and can be 
“reseeded” into the population from their animal reservoirs. These are arguably some of 
the most threatening diseases to society. A great example of a disease in this category is 
influenza A. Influenza A has caused panic in the past and potential unforeseen strains of 
the disease will likely cause us problems in the future. When the disease is highly 
virulent, it would be hard to see isolation and quarantine measures not being ethically 
justified for these diseases. Furthermore, I would argue there is a strong basis for 
mandatory vaccination when possible. Even seasonal influenza - the ‘flu’- experienced 
every year, is damaging enough to potentially warrant mandatory vaccination. The 
misconception of influenza as simply a strong cold, means the motivation to vaccinate is 
often minimal in much of the population. Most fit and healthy individuals will not suffer 
any major consequences of seasonal influenza, but clearly the purpose of the vaccination 
is not necessarily to protect these individuals, but to minimise the potential vectors of 
the disease and thus protect those who may not be candidates for the vaccine. With 
diseases like influenza, herd immunity is imperative. Due to having reservoir hosts, these 
diseases are unlikely to go away in the future and so in addition to isolation and 
quarantine, other control methods like mandatory vaccination, should be considered.  
Stage 5, Airborne Infectious Diseases 
 We now arrive at our last cell in the disease taxonomy table. It is the cell with the 
most of the 25 major infectious diseases outline by Wolfe et al. These diseases are 
exclusive to humans and are transmitted through the air and many of these diseases are 
vaccinated against in childhood. Once again there is a theoretical potential to eradicate 
these diseases and many have decreased dramatically in developed countries due to 
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widespread vaccination. Isolation and quarantine is crucial in many cases here and as we 
saw with the Speaker incident, the risks to society by allowing infected individuals to 
continue unchecked are large. The case for mandatory vaccination when available is 
stronger for these diseases compared to stage 4 diseases, due to the potential to 
eradicate the diseases. Recall the smallpox vaccine was able to be forcibly administered 
under the Health (Infectious and Notifiable Diseases) Regulations 1966.119  
 That concludes this subsection of the thesis. After outlining some of the major 
ethical issues posed by diseases of each cell of the infectious disease taxonomy table, we 
should have a good idea of some of the considerations that need to be made for the 
various diseases. Furthermore, by focusing on the disease categories, or cells, I have 
highlighted the importance of focusing on the biological features of infectious diseases 
when it comes to ethical control strategies. I did not bring the additional biological 
features, outline in the previous subsection, into the equation here, because the reader 
should have a good, intuitive idea of how these would strengthen or weaken certain 
ethical claims in each infectious disease category. Ultimately, this section was intended 
to outline some of the ethical conclusions that arise from each infectious disease 
category.  
3.5 Using the framework: Zika virus and measles. 
 There has been a lot of recent media attention surrounding Zika virus, particularly in 
relation to increased cases of children born with microcephaly in Brazil, thought to be a 
result of pregnant women contracting Zika virus.120 What would our ethical framework and 
disease taxonomy have to say about containment methods for the virus? Zika virus is spread 
through the bite of the Aedes mosquito (although there have been two cases of potential 
sexual transmission) and it causes flu like symptoms. Zika virus is lowly virulent and 
treatment is similar to that of a cold or flu: plenty of rest and fluids. I haven’t been able to 
find the evolutionary stage of the disease, but it has been detected in rhesus monkeys and 
can spread between humans, so it must be either a stage three or four disease.121 The 
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biggest issue of Zika virus seems to be that it may cause microcephaly in children if the 
mother is infected with the disease during pregnancy.122  
 What can we conclude about Zika virus, using the ethical guidelines outlined 
above? It is likely a stage three or four disease of low virulence, which is spread through 
mosquitos and is possibly sexually transmitted. Quarantine and isolation are not going to 
be ethically justified, as due to the mode of transmission, this will be ineffective. 
Experimental treatment is also unlikely to be ethically justified, as the disease is of a very 
low virulence and the potential side-effects of experimental drugs are of a greater cost 
than the potential benefits. However so long as conditions are met, such as those that 
were required for the 2014 EVD outbreak, an argument could be made that if some 
promising experimental drugs looked to prevent microcephaly occurring in new-borns 
upon their mothers use of the drug, then such experimental treatment could be ethically 
justified. There would have to be a very suitable experimental treatment option, with 
very low risk. That said, such measures may not meet the principle of proportionality. A 
better, more affordable and less risky option, might be to make disease testing available 
for those who wish to get pregnant, as well as offering widespread contraception. 
Furthermore, as I stated in the previous subsection, vector control and prevention will 
always be the most direct means of controlling vector-borne disease (once again 
ensuring any adverse effects are accounted for under the principle of reciprocity and 
least restrictive means). This is the strategy advised by the WHO:  
“Mosquitoes and their breeding sites pose a significant risk factor for Zika virus infection. Prevention and 
control relies on reducing mosquitoes through source reduction (removal and modification of breeding 
sites) and reducing contact between mosquitoes and people. 
This can be done by using insect repellent regularly; wearing clothes (preferably light-coloured) that cover 
as much of the body as possible; using physical barriers such as window screens, closed doors and 
windows; and if needed, additional personal protection, such as sleeping under mosquito nets during the 
day.”
123
  
Ultimately, improved family planning and vector control strategies will likely prove a more 
ethical, less risky alternative to utilising experimental treatment. If the disease is sexually 
transmitted, there will be strong moral obligations for those that know themselves to be 
infected to not engage in unprotected sex, without informing their partners first. Failure to 
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do so may be considered a form of assault or harm and is at least unethical and at most 
justified in being prosecutable.   
  Another incident that has been in the media recently is that of a person infected 
with measles risking the health of others by ignoring instructions to isolate themselves, 
instead choosing to roam a busy casino.124 As I said in section 3.2, the medical officer of 
health, who in this case was Dr. Richard Hoskins from Auckland, does have the legal 
authority to order people into quarantine, but “Usually, a heavy-handed approach wasn't 
required.”125 What can we say about the incident? Measles is a stage five, airborne 
disease, with a medium virulence level.126 Due to this relative severity, and the fact that a 
safe and effective vaccine is available, it is a disease that we should very much want to, 
and can, eradicate. Undoubtedly this individual, who knowingly risked the health of 
many people by ignoring medical advice, has committed an unethical act. Should the 
medical officer have ordered the individual into mandatory quarantine? I don’t think so. 
If it is correct that a heavy-handed usually isn’t required,127 then it must be the case that 
most individuals willingly follow their medical professional’s advice. Furthermore, most 
individuals in developed countries, like NZ, are immunized against measles at birth and 
“In 2014, about 85% of the world’s children received 1 dose of measles vaccine by their 
first birthday through routine health services, up from 73% in 2000.”128 Clearly we are 
moving towards herd immunity and it is unlikely the individual in this case would have 
come into contact with many non-immunised individuals. So in this case, advising self-
imposed isolation would have fulfilled both the least restrictive means principle, the 
principle of proportionality, and the principle of harm. What could be said of the 
circumstance, is that there is ethical grounding for medical authorities to have the ability 
to fine those, like the individual in question, who ignore medical advice and put others at 
risk by exposing them to an infectious disease. We can compare this to how we needn’t 
put speed inhibitors in cars in order to stop people speeding, that’d be excessive, and the 
risk of being fined would be a more proportional deterrent.  
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Conclusions. 
 We have now demonstrated how to use significant biological features of infectious 
diseases to come to practical conclusions that uphold important and well founded ethical 
principles. Furthermore, we have shown that by utilising said biological features to generate 
an infectious disease taxonomy, we can arrive at pertinent ethical conclusions about various 
infectious diseases through their key similarities and differences to other infectious 
diseases. By utilising the infectious disease taxonomy we created here, we have identified 
the root causes of our ethical conclusions when it comes to infectious disease control: the 
various biological features of diseases that dramatically alter the way in which they are 
controlled. Through the taxonomy, we can get at the important ethical considerations for 
various diseases in a fast, organised, and sensible manner.  
 What can be said about the conclusions arrived at in this thesis? What is their 
practical significance? We started out to answer four main questions in the area of 
infectious disease control and I believe we have succeeded. The questions are listed at the 
bottom of page three. Let us see how we would respond to them now, knowing what we 
know. The first question is: when, if ever, is it ethically justified to use experimental 
treatment? This was the first questions for us to go into detail on and we used the EVD 
outbreak to examine it. I argued that in the case of the 2014 EVD outbreak, we would be 
ethically justified in utilising experimental treatment and I defended the point against a few 
objections. But to properly answer yes to the question we can’t simply acknowledge it solely 
in the context of the EVD outbreak and this was made clear early on. We would need a 
means by which to answer the question for all infectious disease cases. By utilising the 
disease taxonomy, we now have that means. We now know that stage three diseases are 
much more likely to warrant the use of experimental treatment during outbreaks as the 
opportunity to study the disease in humans often only occurs during outbreaks. 
Furthermore, diseases that are more easily spread, such as through indirect contact or 
through the air, are more likely to fulfil the harm principle and thus warrant measures such 
as the use of experimental treatment. Additionally, if a disease is highly virulent we have the 
same issue as above: the harm principle is more likely to be met and thus the potential 
benefits of using experimental treatment (saving lives) is likely to outweigh the costs 
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(potential unknown side effects). Stage four and five diseases tend to persist in the human 
population for long periods of time and thus can be studied year round, thus there is not an 
imperative to rush the development of treatment due to a small window of opportunity. 
Therefore, the use of experimental treatment may not always be justified, unless a given 
outbreak is particularly bad. So we can conclude that the answer to the first question posed 
in the introduction to this thesis is: it is very likely that the use of experimental treatments 
during outbreaks of highly virulent, stage three diseases, which are spread through either 
indirect contact or through the air, is ethically justified. Furthermore, it is likely that the use 
of experimental treatments during bad outbreaks of highly virulent, stage four and five 
diseases, which are spread through either indirect contact or through the air, is ethically 
justified. Both of these answers will of course assume that Upshur’s four ethical principles 
will be met. This is not an exact answer, but that’s exactly the point: you cannot account for 
practical concerns of particular disease outbreaks until they occur. However, using the 
disease taxonomy table, we are able to quickly come to a probabilistic, ethical conclusion, 
which immediately gets us pointed in the right direction.  
 The second question we looked to answer was: when is quarantine/isolation 
ethically justified? We found that during the 2014 EVD outbreak, quarantine and isolation 
was ethically justified, although it wasn’t carried out well in this particular case. The two 
biggest biological features that played into our answer to the question of quarantine and 
isolation were: mode of transmission and virulence. There is little point in quarantining or 
isolating individuals who don’t spread the disease via indirect contact or through the air as 
there simply isn’t reason to believe such measures will dramatically impact the spread of the 
disease. Furthermore, we found that if a society fulfilled its obligations under the principle 
of reciprocity, we can conclude that individuals have an obligation to self-isolate, even for 
diseases with low virulence. So we can say that when it comes to mandatory isolation or 
quarantine, it is very likely these actions will be ethically justified for highly virulent, stage 
three, four, and five diseases, which are spread through indirect contact or through the air. 
Additionally, there is a moral imperative for individuals to self-isolate for diseases with low 
virulence, assuming society is fulfilling the principle of reciprocity. Finally, the harm principle 
and least restrictive means principles will mean the measures taken to isolate and 
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quarantine individuals, will likely be proportional to the virulence of the disease: the higher 
the virulence, the more extreme measures need to be taken.  
 Our answers to questions three and four are interlocked. The questions were: What 
are the key ethical principles to adhere to when it comes to infectious disease control; and, 
does our application of ethical principles vary between diseases? We found that the key 
ethical principles to adhere to when considering infectious disease control measures are: 
the principles of reciprocity, harm, proportionality, and transparency. When all of these 
principles are upheld, a particular infectious disease control action can be considered 
ethically justified. Furthermore, how we apply these principles is going to differ greatly 
between diseases due to key biological factors. It was ultimately this line of thinking that led 
to our disease taxonomy table.  
 I would like to take a moment to comment on the methodology of this thesis. This 
thesis started with a real-world case study: the 2014 EVD outbreak. By examining the ethical 
questions that arose during the outbreak, we developed a good sense for the kinds of issues 
that arise in the ethics of infectious disease control, during real-world scenarios. 
Furthermore, the case study provided a base from which to ask the question: would we 
have come to the same conclusions if the disease was different? If we were to come to 
different conclusions, why would this be the case? This shift in focus allowed us to discuss 
some of the key ethical principles to be upheld during infectious disease control and 
highlighted some important differences between our application of these principles to 
varying diseases. From here, we began to hone in on exactly what the important biological 
features of diseases are. Ultimately, this led us to the creation of the ethical framework for 
the infectious disease taxonomy. This framework, I have argued, could be applied to public 
policy to aid in decision making regarding ethical infectious disease control. It provides a 
useful methodology for future discussions of the ethics of infectious disease control. So I 
hope it is clear that I have attempted to guide the reader to our conclusions in a logical 
manner. Furthermore, I hope these conclusions are easily reachable by more general 
readers of this thesis, not simply academic philosophers and bioethicists (I touch on this 
point again in the afterword). Finally, I hope the ethical framework that arises from the 
infectious disease taxonomy table, can aid in further discussion around the ethics of 
infectious disease control and infectious disease control policy. 
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Afterword: 
 To the best of my ability within the framework of academia, I have attempted to 
make this thesis both interesting and comprehensible to the general reader, not just 
academic philosophers. This unfortunately seems to run counter to the current state of 
academic philosophy in many parts of the world. I do not have strong opinions on the 
matter and have nothing but gratitude for those academic philosophers that made my 
studies interesting, challenging, and enlightening. I do however think that the matter of 
philosophy students perhaps being encouraged to talk about the abstract and the abstruse 
over the interesting issues of the real world is worth noting.  
 An article recently came out on the website “Quartz”, quoting philosopher Daniel 
Dennett’s thoughts on the issue. Dennett was quoted as remarking “A great deal of 
philosophy doesn’t really deserve much of a place of the world,”… “Philosophy in some 
quarters has become self-indulgent, clever play in a vacuum that’s not dealing of problems 
of any intrinsic interest.”129 The article continues: “This ‘cottage industry’ certainly isn’t 
helped by the pressure on young philosophy students to publish papers. ‘It can take years of 
hard work to develop the combination of scholarly mastery and technical acumen to work 
on big, important issues with a long history of philosophical attention,’ says Dennett. ‘In the 
meantime, young philosophers are under great pressure to publish, so they find toy topics 
that they can knock off a clever comment/rebuttal/revival of.’”130 This is clearly going to 
vary from university to university, in which respect I was pretty fortunate, but I do believe it 
to be a strong theme in academic philosophy. I will finish this section with a quote from Sam 
Harris’ book “The Moral Landscape”, which is a great quote that relates to this issue: 
“Many of my critics fault me for not engaging more directly with the academic literature on 
moral philosophy. There are two reasons why I haven’t done this: First, while I have read a 
fair amount of this literature, I did not arrive at my position on the relationship between 
human values and the rest of human knowledge by reading the work of moral philosophers; 
I came to it by considering the logical implications of our making continued progress in the 
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sciences of mind. Second, I am convinced that every appearance of terms like “metaethics,” 
“deontology,” “noncognitivism,” “antirealism,” “emotivism,” etc., directly increases the 
amount of boredom in the universe. My goal, both in speaking at conferences like TED and 
in writing this book, is to start a conversation that a wider audience can engage with and 
find helpful. Few things would make this goal harder to achieve than for me to speak and 
write like an academic philosopher. Of course, some discussion of philosophy will be 
unavoidable, but my approach is to generally make an end run around many of the views 
and conceptual distinctions that make academic discussions of human values so 
inaccessible. While this is guaranteed to annoy a few people, the professional philosophers 
I’ve consulted seem to understand and support what I am doing.”131 
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